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1. Introduction    
 
 
The following is a textual and systematic analysis of a selection of Islamic literature. Some of 
the literature in question is primarily devoted to da‟wah, the propagation of Islam, and 
consequently aimed at the reader‘s conversion. Other authors take a more philosophical 
approach, yet remain faithful to the fundamental teachings of Islam. Assuming that the issue 
can be treated meaningfully within the frameworks of academic enquiry, the aim of this 
study is to come closer to a phenomenological understanding of Islam, as far as the selected 
literature makes it available.  
 
As a starting point we will ask: Are there identifiable philosophical patterns to be discovered 
in this literature? Specifically, what are the premises of arguments relating to the existence 
and nature of God? Assuming we will come to a better understanding of the method behind 
these arguments in light of classic Islamic thought, how is divine revelation conceived to 
relate conceptually to human rationality?  
 
In order to come closer to a phenomenological understanding of Islam, we need to identify its 
epistemological foundations. By epistemological foundation, we simply mean that which a 
religious truth claim rests upon in order to be true.  Identifying a religious truth claim 
phenomenologically neither reduces it as such, nor makes it subject to normative theological 
judgment. However, questions do arise upon reading the material. Islamic da‟wah claims not 
only to tell the truth about God. It seeks to prove God‘s existence and the divine origin of 
revelation. An approach which takes the complexity of the material seriously must involve 
critical examination as to whether or not transcendence can be proven.  
 
The sources that have been selected here are primarily da‟wah literature as it is presented to 
an English-speaking, mainly Western audience. This type of literature must be viewed 
against the backdrop of increased contact between communities, both religious and secular. 
The call to embrace Islam is a consequence of its claim of universality and is not a modern 
invention. The word ‗defense‘ suggests, however, that a particular effort is made as to 
5 
 
making Islam intellectually acceptable when approaching at a Western reader. Abdul Wadod 
Shalabi
1
 has expressed this concern in his book Islam. Religion of life:  
 
‗This book is written about Islam from within. It seeks to show something of the true nature of faith, thereby 
challenging the accepted stereotypes which so badly compromise the present dialogue of civilizations. By 
explaining the significance of the formal practices and doctrines of the Islamic religion it endeavours to build a 
bridge over what must be the deepest yet most irrational gulf ever to have cleaved apart two cultures.
2
 
 
The aim of this study does not include dealing with the aspects of Islam that are of special 
interest to the sociology of religion. Our topic does relate to practical issues, such as for 
example an ongoing debate over the integration of Islamic theology in Western universities. 
What happens when philosophical expositions of Islamic doctrine meets a Western 
intellectual tradition? While our approach here must not be considered an attempt at a 
comparative study, it is nevertheless assumed that it is possible and worthwhile to treat this 
relationship on a philosophical level.  
 
We begin our analysis by presenting efforts at proving the existence of God. The focus of 
chapter 3 will be how certainty about God‘s existence is thought to be reached through 
empirical observation or rational processes.  In chapter 4 we ask: According to Islamic 
da‟wah, what is the nature of God? Here we will concentrate on efforts to prove tawhid, the 
principle of divine unity. In chapter 5 we turn to literature which may help us understand the 
methodology behind these arguments. It is here that an Islamic view on the relationship 
between revelation and rationality will be examined in greater detail. The final chapter will 
provide a reflection on how we may respond to the arguments with the tools available in the 
area of religious studies, especially the phenomenology of religion. It will also explore 
whether it would be appropriate to approach Islamic thought, as it is presented here, within a 
broader academic perspective. But first, there is more to be said on how we may best 
approach our material. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 With a scholarly background from both the al-Azhar University in Cairo and the University of Cambridge, 
Shalabi is the author of several books covering different aspects of Islam.      
2
 Shalabi 2006:4  
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2. Material and method. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
 
The primary tools for this study are provided by the chosen texts themselves, in terms of their 
self-presentation as texts speaking to man‘s ability to reason. In order to come to a deeper 
understanding of the epistemology of the selected da‘wah literature, I have included 
academic resources written from within an Islamic perspective. I will also approach the topic 
with analytical tools provided within the field of religious studies and philosophy of science 
as practised within the Western academic paradigm.  
  
 
2.2 Brief presentation of selected literature.  
 
2.2.1 Islamic da‟wah literature 
 
I have been aiming toward a qualitative selection to show a representative and varied picture 
of da‟wah literature with a focus on the rational aspects of Islam. Some books are regarded 
as ‗classics‘, others more recently published. Some books are originally publications from 
theological faculties in Ryiadh and Cairo, others are linked to doctorates from Western 
universities. As this is a type of literature with certain audiences in mind, I have taken into 
account and considered what is actually being handed out or distributed in relation to da‟wah 
efforts in Islamic centres in the Middle East and Western countries
3
. At first here I will very 
briefly present the central authors, although the collection of sources used will be wider. 
There are popular authors of da‟wa literature, whom I have not chosen as a primary source, 
as the content leans more often toward polemics than toward the fundamental teachings of 
Islam.
4
. The literature I have chosen can be categorized in two according to agenda and 
                                                 
3
 For example the Al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo and Islamic Cultural Centre Norway.  
4
 I have not selected for example Ahmed Deedat, whose statements enjoy a certain popularity, but also 
controversy. His arguments often take the form of polemics, where foundations of other religious beliefs are 
being attacked, but in a way that representatives of those beliefs would not recognize. I have included some 
polemic material, in terms of arguments against posed central Christian doctrine (for example Bilal Philips), but 
I have avoided the most extreme literature. This would surely add an interesting complexity, but, as in the case 
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academic level, yet somewhat overlapping in content. The first type is literature aimed 
towards the reader‘s conversion. In this category belong authors such as Abdul Wadod 
Shalabi: Islam. Religion of life (2006)
5
. Shalabi received his theological training at the Al-
Azhar University in Cairo and holds a doctorate from the University of Cambridge. He is 
believed to stand firmly on one leg in each ‗camp‘, or as put in the preface, holds ‗an acute 
understanding of the crisis of the modern world [which] has placed him in a unique position 
to distill and introduce Islam to multitudes raised in the West‘ 6 Musavi Lari‘s God and His 
Attributes. Lessons on Islamic Doctrine (2000) is a thorough presentation of the basics of 
Islamic theology in which, he ‗convincingly refutes the materialist point of view while 
presenting sound reasoning for the monotheistic world view‘7. Musavi Lari was born in Iran, 
where he also completed his studies. He has since travelled and done scholarly work across 
the world. Other books include Abul Ala Mawdudi‘s classic Islams fundamenter8, 
Hammudah Abdulati‘s Introduksjon til Islam9, more populist literature such as Zaghlul El-
Naggar: Scientific Facts Revealed in the Glorious Qur‟an‖( 2006)10 and Bilal Philips: The 
true message of Jesus Christ. (1989)
11
. The latter can be described as being popular form, but 
conveying academic aspirations. I believe it is also worth including two recordings of 
lectures held by popular speakers, the first being westerner Abdur Raheem Green with his 
philosophical lecture: ‗Does God exist?‟, the other being Indian born Zakir Naik, who argues 
on the same topic, but uses natural science as support for his views.  
 
The second type of books, we may classify as systematic academic literature. These works 
are more elaborate in their argumentation, they consider classic Islamic thought more 
systematically, and bring the discussion to a methodological level. I have mainly included 
two major works by Malay scholar Osman Bakar: The history and Philosophy of Islamic 
                                                                                                                                                       
of Deedat perhaps helpful only to a purely literary analysis. The aim here is to identify what Islam presents 
itself to be and base my further reflections on that. Major aspects of Deedats arguments are well covered by 
other authors, some of which are also clearly inspired by his authorship. 
5
 Edited by A.H Murad. Shourouk Int Bookshop , Cairo. 
6
 From back cover. 
7
 From bak cover. 
8
 First published in Urdu in 1937.Engnlish versions are often titled Towards understanding Islam. Several 
online editions are available. For reference purposes I have used the Norwegian version here. Quotations are my 
own translations.  
9
 Translation: Introduction to Islam. Published by Islamic Cultural Centre Norway. An English version exists 
under the name of Islam in Focus (1998). 
10
 There are two editions. One written by El-Nagar, with subtitle Selected examples from the area of Earth 
Sciences (2006), the other edited by Nabil Haroun (2006) and contains a transcription of a television interview  
11
 St. David‘s college, University of Wales is listed, but probably as a place where Philips got his academic 
degree, not the publisher. The foreword is dated 1989, but from references made the edition must be from later 
than 1994.  
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Science(1999) and Classification of knowledge in Islam. A Study in Islamic Philosophies of 
Science(1998). As background material I have also included Iranian philosopher and Islamic 
scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr: Science and Civilization in Islam.(1987). Nasr has also written 
the foreword in Bakar‘s book from 1998.  
  
 
2.2.2 Theoretical sources:  
 
The major bulk of first-hand research for this project has been conducted on the Islamic 
literature. I have sought to analyze the arguments found in it, and through that establish the 
premises of the argumentation.  I have approached the systematic Islamic literature with the 
aim of analyzing the arguments and to understand the methodology behind them. General 
references to the fields of philosophy and theology will be made underway. This study is not 
meant to be comparative in the sense that defined Islamic and Western traditions are put up 
next to one another, or equally considered. Some epistemological concerns do arise, 
however, and I have attempted to meet them with tools provided by our field of study. 
Helpful introductory literature has been: Brian Davies: An introduction to the Philosophy of 
Religion (2004), Antonio B. da Silva: Hva er religionsfenomenologi? (1996)
12
, Peter 
Connolly (ed.): Approaches to the Study of Religion (1999), and Alan F. Chalmers: What is 
this thing called Science? (1999)  
 
 
2.3. Analyzing Islamic material in an academic context.  
 
2.3.1. Choosing an angle: God 
 
I ventured into this literature hoping to eventually grasp the essence of the arguments. But 
how does one choose an approach to make sure one does not miss out on that which is most 
significant? I have wanted to touch upon issues such as reason and revelation, philosophy 
and theology and how they play out in Islamic discourse. One will for example quickly note 
                                                 
12
 Transl.: What is (the) phenomenology of religion? Major elements of the discussion here are also found in da 
Silva‘s doctoral thesis: The phenomenology of Religion as a Philosophical Problem, Uppsala 1982.   
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the claim that it is possible, and preferred, to have factual knowledge of religious issues. By 
factual knowledge based on verifiable facts, and not knowledge as personal conviction.  
Epistemological concerns are believed to account, in an equal manner, for the whole 
hierarchy of knowledge. At the top of this hierarchy thrones divine knowledge, the source of 
all other truths.  
 
As a starting point in the process of dealing with the chosen da‟wah literature, I have 
analyzed how the writers respond to their own questions, also known from the field of 
philosophy, such as ‗does God exist?‘, ‗what is the nature of God?‘, and ‗how can we know 
anything about God?‘. 
 
 
2.3.2. Choosing a lens: Approaches to the study of religion.  
 
As a starting point I have wanted to let the material to speak for itself. What I have looked for 
specifically are identifiable patterns of reasoning and identifiable philosophical axioms, both 
the ones made explicit and those remaining implicit. Some emerge quite clearly from reading 
through the books even briefly. Have I set out to find the methodology of da‟wah? Not 
quite. But I believe it to be of value to reflect on the way arguments are being presented, 
either as directly spelled out or more subtle. This requires a qualitative research of these 
arguments, using specific examples which I have found to be representative.  
 
When attempting to discuss Islamic theological literature meaningfully in an academic 
context, one is faced with concerns on a number of levels: First of all, as a researcher of a 
type of literature aiming for the reader‘s conversion, one finds oneself belonging in the target 
group. One needs to find a way to remain an ‗outsider‘ as if the content did not have 
implications for eternity (a practical judgement), while recognizing the intended level of 
seriousness. Secondly, one needs to assert whether the views portrayed can be attributed to a 
representative community of scholars at the present, or belonging in ‗alternative‘ camps, or 
simply the occasional ‗apologetic‘ experiment. Thirdly, there is the task of handling a wide 
variety of academic levels. It can be useful to ask whether a book is ‗academic‘ in the sense 
that it can be used as a viable source of information, or whether the author is biased in his 
10 
 
approach. Meanwhile, literature which does not consider conflicting views at all can also 
provide interesting information about its method.   
  
The books present themselves as clearly religious, antithetical to atheism and secularism.  
A definition of religion might be redundant, but one made by Connolly describes well the 
starting point for the Islamic discourse in question, as well as this research of it: ‗[M]y 
definition of the term ‗religion‘ is: any beliefs which involve the acceptance of a sacred, 
trans-empirical realm and any behavior designed to affect a person‟s relationship with that 
realm‘13 Connolly also points out that ‗information never occurs in a vacuum. Accurate, 
objective accounts of religious phenomena and religious traditions simply do not exist in 
their own right.‘ Here, Islamic scholars are bound to disagree. But as committed to the study 
of religion, we need to, at our best, pursue what Ninian Smart called ‗methodological 
agnosticism‘14, which, in Connelly‘s words, entail ‗neither a commitment to the truth or 
accuracy of one or more religious views[…]nor a conviction of their falsity or inaccuracy.‘15 
Connelly further believes an open mind to be the primary requisite towards 
‗phenomenological epoché, the imaginative entering into the world of others‘16. If one is to 
make a qualitative judgement at all one must at least identify the premises of these 
judgements.  
 
The chosen method is, as mentioned, textual and systematic analysis. I have no intention here 
of discovering the ‗essence‘17 of Islam as it is. Nor make judgements on its truth or falsity. In 
terms of purely describing the doctrinal and philosophical dimensions
18
 of Islam, the sources 
speak well for themselves. In other words, a phenomenological approach of simply 
‗bracketing‘ arguments based solely on their self-understanding, is not going to get us much 
further than the sources themselves. I will therefore, toward the end, raise some 
epistemological concerns which may, after all, help bring us closer to an understanding of the 
foundations of Islam. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Connolly 1999:6-7 
14
 Connolly 1999:2. 
15
 Connolly 1999:2 
16
 Connolly 1999:2-3. 
17
  Discussed in da Silva/Ore 1996:68 as the counterpart to descriptive phenomenology. 
18
 Connolly 1999:x. (Smart) and Connolly:233-235. (Whaling)  
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2.3.3. Use of terminology.  
 
What is ‗knowledge‘? What is ‗reason‘? Abdel-Wahab Elmessiri, an Egyptian professor of 
English literature mentions in one article named Recapturing the Islamic Paradigm
19
, that 
one cannot simply translate concepts such as ‗aql‘ and ‗fiqh‘ into English. Apart from the 
obvious problems of direct translation from one language to another, words have different 
origin, development and play different roles in today‘s discourse. Arguments may prove 
foreign to the reader for this very reason. However, I do believe it is far from necessary to 
reduce the discussion purely to the level of linguistics. The writers and publishers have aimed 
these books at a Western, non-Arabic-speaking audience. Accordingly, my analysis is based 
on the assumption that it is possible to say something about issues related to reason and 
rationality in Islam on a phenomenological level, using an English academic terminology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Elmessiri 2003: Common translations: ‗aql – knowledge or doctrine.  fiqh - jurisprudence.  
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3. The existence of God. 
 
 
3.1. Introduction.  
 
Hammudah Abdualti states in his introduction: ‗Knowledge of God and the belief in him 
comprises the very foundation of Islam. It is such an essential topic it requires a thorough and 
clear presentation. For the sake of clarity, however, we will make use of some simple 
evidence‘20. The defence of fundamental Islamic doctrine is set against the background of 
secularism, materialism and ‗Islamophobia‘21, and to authors of Islamic da‟wah this is a 
serious task. Abdulati states further: ‗The purpose of life is to worship God‘22 According to 
Shalabi, ‗Religion is indeed the only meaningful activity of man23‘, it is always urgent. Thus, 
the message of Islam would appear to be of eternal importance for the individual reader, if he 
indeed be one of the unbelievers, or in modern terms; an atheists or sceptic.  It is assumed 
that rejection of Islam is, in essence, based on a distorted image of it.
24
 The intellectual 
defence of Islam is therefore aimed at presenting fundamental articles of faith, not only 
convincingly, but in a way that is understandable to the reader.  
 
Taking on the assumption that the question is worth asking, and that it can be answered in a 
meaningful way, what is it, according to Islamic da‟wah that makes the existence of God so 
evident? The arguments vary greatly in terms of complexity throughout the discourse. It is, 
however, possible to identify patterns of thought. I have chosen to present these according to 
two classic categories; firstly: conclusions which can be arrived at through reasoning alone, 
and secondly; conclusions drawn from assertive experience. The first category I have 
labelled ‗ontological‘, and the second I have labelled ‗cosmological‘. This is not to say that 
the authors have consciously adhered to them as such. Both categories belong in a Western 
philosophical tradition. However, as a fruitful starting point for further discussion I consider 
it is fair to use them. It is also fair to suggest that in this particular context of defensive 
                                                 
20
 Abdulati:11.‖Kjennskap til Gud og troen på Ham utgjør selve Islams grunnlag.‖ 
21
 See for example article by s.Rashad: ‗The urgency of Da‟wah in the West. Countering Islamophobia‘.(2007) 
http://www.readingislam.com/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1165994164172&pagename=Zone-English-
Discover_Islam%2FDIELayout. Retrieved 10.02.10.  
22
 Abdulati:26 
23
 Shalabi 2006:5  
24
 Abdulati:5. 
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discourse we are mainly dealing with what can be referred to as ‗natural theology‘.  As a 
definition we can think of natural theology as the attempt to show that belief in God‘s 
existence can be supported by reason or argument which ought to be accepted to anyone
25
.  It 
says, in other words that one need not presuppose God‘s existence in order to defend it. An 
important feature in this literature is the assumption that the question can be approached from 
an objective point of view.  One of the authors, Dr. Bilal Philips, presents his method in the 
introduction: ‗The only way that we may find the truth about anything is to approach it 
systematically and logically.‘26, and God is not exempt from such investigation.  
 
 
 
3.2. Ontological arguments 
 
An ontological argument uses the method of a priori proof, which uses intuition and reason 
alone
27
 and is not based on sensual experience. As suggested above, the following examples 
are not all to be understood as fully developed philosophical arguments. The aim here is not 
to discuss whether they are all fit to be called ‗ontological‘. The aim is to describe the general 
method, which is to identify what can be known, naturally, of the transcendent object (God is 
even defined as the ‗ideal object of worship‘28) and from there draw the conclusion that he 
must exist. Let us turn to two major types of arguments that are not supported by 
experimental knowledge. The first one is related to the human soul, the second to Islam‘s 
claim of universality. 
 
 
3.2.1. The religious nature of man. 
 
The first Islamic article of faith, the Kalimah, says: ‗la ilaha illa‟Llah‟, there is no deity save 
God.
29
 The Arabic word Ilah, ‗someone who is the object of worship‘30, means a being 
                                                 
25
 Davies 2004:41. (Davies also lists alternative definitions, for example ‗the attempt to ground beliefs about 
God on purely rational reflection‘ p.41.)  
26
 Philips:3 
27
 Oppy, Graham. "Ontological Arguments". in Edward N. Zalta. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 
1095-5054. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments. Retrieved Nov.1,2009.  
28
 Musavi Lari 2000:101 
29
 Shalabi 2006:7. 
30
 Mawdudi 1990:64. ‟en som er gjenstand for tilbedelse‟.  
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whose greatness and power is worthy of worship. Anything which has a power greater than 
man can fathom or conceive, is also called Ilah.
31
 The word entails unlimited power, and 
carries the meaning of something veiled in mystery. Ilah has parallels in other languages, 
such as the English ‗God‘. Mawdudi believes the need to worship and to have a deity, to be 
anchored in human nature. There is something in the human soul which forces it to act in 
such a way. What, then, according to Islamic da‟wah is this something? 
 
To Green, the question is not really ‗is there a god?‘, because ‗there are millions of gods‘32. 
All cultures have concepts of a transcendent being, he says. But then he refers not only the 
gods of other religions or even idols or things, but ideas and concepts, such as communism. 
There are many gods, he says, but ‗are they really capable of giving people what they want 
and what they need?‘33 Green concludes that there is only one God who can help and this 
must be the God of Islam. Shalabi wants to show that Islam is ‗no opiate‘34. Modern living 
and status symbols are ‗tasteless and without meaning‘35. The reason, he says, is ‗understood 
intuitively by many‘36, but few know how to respond. ‗We have lost contact with the mystery 
which lies within ourselves; we have forgotten what we are.‘37 He further quotes scientist 
Julian Huxley, who is to have said: ‗The blank space in the modern heart is a God shaped 
blank.‘38 Life without the transcendent, says Shalabi, ‗is not only desultory and without 
meaning, it is miserable, as the Qur‘an tells us‘39.   
 
According to Musavi Lari, it is ‗[t]he depths of man‘s being [which] impel him to seek 
God.‘40 Musavi Lari holds knowledge of God‘s existence -at the most fundamental level - to 
be a natural and innate perception. This natural and innate perception can nevertheless be 
forgotten upon entering ‗the sphere of science and philosophy‘41 with its various proofs and 
deductions. The Quran is to have called it man‘s fitra, his ‗natural disposition.‘42which is ‗to 
love God, beauty, and all humanity, and to feel revulsion towards selfishness, ugliness and 
                                                 
31
 Mawdudi 1990:65. 
32
 Transcribed from ca 0:16:27. 
33
 Green: Does God exist? Transcribed from ca 0:16:48-55. 
34
 Shalabi 2006:80. 
35
 Shalabi 2006:79. 
36
 Shalabi 2006:79. 
37
 Shalabi 2006:79. 
38
 Shalabi 2006:79. 
39
 Shalabi 2006:79. 
40
 Musavi Lari 2000:19. 
41
 Musavi Lari 2000:19. 
42
 Shalabi 2006: 14. No reference is made to particular verses in the Qur‘an. 
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evil.‘43 Man‘s moral qualities and sense of aesthetics, although with limitations, imply that 
there is something greater, which is not limited. There is no god, but Allah is thus ‗an 
affirmation of complete transcendence; the most perfect articulation of what lies forever 
beyond the reach of language
44
. The God is none other than the one God that other religions 
have different concepts of.  Contrary to currents in Western studies on the history of 
religion
45, Musavi Lari‘s account does not begin with primal religion culminating in 
monotheism. It begins with a belief in one God. Nowhere in his book is there a specific 
reference to any historical research made, in fact, it seems that the whole field of history of 
religion is met with a great deal of scepticism. Musavi Lari views monotheism as ‗without 
doubt one of the principal sources of human culture and knowledge‘.46 That which mankind 
has sought and worshipped throughout history is none other than the god, Al‟lah. Shalabi 
uses even more inclusive language: ‗[T]he founders of the great religions of mankind shared 
in a common vision, an experience of that absolute state of beyond-being which in the 
English language call God‘.47 Nasr appears to be on the same note when he claims that to 
embrace Islam should, even for a Westerner, be understood as a reversion, a ‗restoration of a 
primordial and fundamental unity ‘48, and not a conversion to something foreign.  
 
Musavi Lari also criticizes the sociological theories which conclude, ‗unsupported by any 
evidence‘49, that God is a human fabrication. He asks rhetorically50 ‗Is the belief in religion 
of thousands of scholars and thinkers the product of fear […]? Can their inclination to 
religion, the result of scholarly studies, of logic and rational proof, be attributed to their 
ignorance and lack of awareness of the natural causes of phenomena? What would be the 
answer of an intelligent person?‘51 Musavi Lari further holds that man‘s natural inclination to 
be religious has only recently been called into question by what he calls ‗materialists‘52. With 
his arguments he seeks to show that the views of materialists cannot be effectively sustained. 
However, there is another point in the questioning of God‘s existence that he does not 
                                                 
43
 Shalabi 2006:14.  
44
 Shalabi 2006:11 
45
 See for example David Gellner‘s summary of the history of anthropology in Connolly 1999:10.  
46
 Musavi Lari 2000:81. 
47
 Shalabi 2006:6 
48
 Nasr 1987:22. 
49
 Musavi Lari 2000:15. 
50
 In response to Bertrand Russell.: ―In m opinion, religion is above all founded on fear: fear of the unknown, 
fear of death, fear of defeat, fear of the mysterious and hidden. In addition, as already remarked, a sentiment 
comes into being enabling everyone to imagine that he has a supporter in all problems and struggles‟ (From 
Russel:Why I Am Not A Christian, p-37. Quoted in Musavi Lari:15.  
51
 Musavi Lari 2000:18. 
52
 Musavi Lari 2000:81. 
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address. Even if we were to understand the history of religion exactly as Musavi Lari 
describes it, the fitra argument does not take into account the possibility that the majority of 
‗intelligent people‘ may have gotten it wrong. Even if we were to conclude that man is 
essentially religious, or that the hole in the modern heart is a God shaped hole, where is the 
proof that it is not just a hole? As Davies points out that ‗[i]f only a proper understanding of 
God is to lead one to conclude that God exists
53
, it should be questioned whether we can 
simply define something into existence. The problem of an intentional argument is 
essentially as follows: To define this ‗something‘ that would be properly addressed ‗God‘ as 
God, does not mean that it actually exists. It is a valid argument if the premise is already 
given. But writers here claim that God‘s existence can be objectively proven. An atheist who 
does not feel that his depths impel him to seek God will only draw from the argument that 
someone believes he should. There is no direct link drawn from man‘s fitra to the actual 
existence of the ‗proper object of worship.‘54 Instead the reader is left to ponder the various 
accounts of the history of religion. Mawdudi‘s definition of Ilah as ‗anything which has a 
power greater than man can conceive (or fathom),‘ comes close to the starting point of 
Anselm‘s ontological argument55, but it does not develop any further than that. We may grant 
Islamists the notion that non-religious people are outnumbered by those who do believe in 
the existence of a deity. What is interesting here, then, is how indications of a majority in 
agreement is so boldly presented as not only indication, but proof. This brings us to the next 
point, the concept of ‗common sense‘.  
 
 
3.2.2 The „common sense‟ argument. 
 
In addition to calling arguments ‗reasonable‘ or ‗rational‘ some authors claim them to be the 
truth simply because they are ‗common sense‘. What do they mean by this? The term 
‗common sense‘ signifies something beyond having simply run out of persuasive arguments. 
Green defines common sense as that which is obvious to everyone except the insane and 
‗perhaps philosophers‘56 He believes scepticism against Islam to be rooted not so much in 
                                                 
53
 Davies 2004:98 
54
 Musavi Lari 2000:101. See also 3.2 (introductory paragraph.) 
55
 Anselm (1033-1109) defines God as „something than which nothing greater can be conceived‟, and from 
there derives that „for sure that than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist only in the intellect. 
For if it is only in the intellect it can be thought to be in reality as well, which is greater.‟ or „For if it is only in 
the intellect, what is greater can be thought to be in reality as well. (Davies‘ own translations  in Davies:99) 
56
 Green: Does God exist? Transcribed from 0:21:22 
17 
 
disagreement as in misunderstandings. Most people who criticise Islamic laws, for instance, 
do so not on the basis of the fundamentals of Islam, but their unfortunate impression of what 
it teaches. And the reason for that is, as he puts it: ‗The fundamentals of what Islam teaches 
are so firmly rooted in reason and common sense that it is really virtually impossible to 
produce any type of effective argument against it.‘57 He then goes on to describe what these 
fundamentals are, beginning with the ‗obvious‘ existence of God. 
 
It is often brought up as a point that Islam has no clergy as distinguished from the ordinary 
followers. It is a faith without intermediaries
58
. There is no secretive transmission of 
knowledge. ‗Common sense‘ is not necessarily that which is evident to everyone, but rather 
that which is evident to anyone. Abdulati believes in presenting clear and simple proofs, 
although it could ‗seem boring or oversimplified for someone who already knows something 
about the topic‘59. He does not wish to address doubters, who, in his opinion, complicate 
Islam‘s understanding of God. The simplicity may cause the more ‗enlightened people60‘ to 
think more thoroughly through the message. If this turns out to be the results, the simplicity 
will have turned out to be a ‗desired and creative simplicity‘61, which in itself is one of the 
special features of Islam. 
 
The ‗common sense‘ argument is meant to be effective as ‗proof‘ in that it is not a feature of 
the individual, although he may possess it. Rather it seems to represent an ideal, rooted in an 
agreement of the majority. The concept of ‗common sense‘ must also be understood in 
relation to Islam‘s claim of universality. On the one hand, Islam entails a detailed set of rules 
for living
62
. Yet, in paragraphs where the fundamental beliefs about God are portrayed, so is 
also a relatively positive view on cultural variation.
63
 Cultures are corrupted in their worship 
and their ways. However, humanity is believed to have had intuitive knowledge of God since 
creation, not only as individuals but collectively as well. Consequently, there are traces of 
monotheism to be found in every society.  
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Again, we may object and say that ‗common sense‘ appears to only signify a collective 
understanding of what God ought to be. ‗Common sense‘ may be understood as a purely 
rational, innate human feature, or as collective memory in some form of the original state of 
monotheism. In either case, it appears that the human being is simply made to understand 
that there is a God that they must worship. There is no ‗special sacramental function‘64, no 
elaborate theological doctrines, one more unlikely than the other, such as is claimed to be the 
case with for example the different sects of Christianity
65
. What sets Islam apart from all 
other religions is its simplicity. ‗God‘ is a concept anyone can relate to, that is anyone except 
the insane ‗and perhaps philosophers‘66.  In other words, when using the common sense 
argument, such as Green does, he leaves his listener without much chance. A type of proof 
which goes: ‗it is only common sense to believe in God‘ is very difficult to argue with.  
 
 
 
3.3. Cosmological arguments 
 
3.3.1. The kalam argument 
 
The kalam argument is found in any theistic thinking, but originated in an Islamic context.
67
 
In short, it holds that the universe had a beginning and only God could have brought this 
about. The fact that anything exists at all proves that there has to be a First Cause. Often, the 
arguments simply draw attention to the existence of the universe. Abdulati asks ‗[c]an we 
find an explanation to this enormous universe?‘68 And further, that ‗[w]e recognize […] that 
nothing can come into being by itself‘69. Something must have caused the existence of the 
universe, and this is what we worship as God. ‗The one who makes something must be 
different from and greater than what he makes.‘70 In more philosophical terms, the existence 
of creation necessitates the existence of a Creator. 
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Musavi Lari brings the topic to an in-depth discussion in a chapter he calls ‗The Need of the 
World for One Without Need‘71. He begins with the principle of causality as a universal law 
and ‗foundation for all efforts of man‘72, including the acquisition of knowledge. ‗Any 
supposable phenomenon‘, he says, ‗was submerged in the darkness of non-being before it 
assumed the form of being.‘73 When they ‗hastened toward the point of being ‘74, this was the 
result of a cause that impelled them in that direction. The relationship between cause and 
effect is the relationship between two existing things, in the sense that the existence of one of 
them is dependent on the existence of the other.  Therefore, that which brought the existing 
thing into being must have been an external thing. The existence of matter, for instance, must 
have had a beginning. Its impulse must have been eternal, and it must also be transcendent.  
Musavi Lari concludes that ‗no phenomenon becomes  manifest in the world until a certain 
power is bestowed on it by one whose essence is free from need and is itself the very source 
from which being gushes forth‘75. From there he rejects the deistic notion that the First Cause 
can withdraw from the world once it has been brought into existence. ‗[A]ll phenomena – all 
contingent beings – derive at all times and in every instant from an infinite essence that 
bestows being – i.e. the Necessary Being, the Unique and Almighty Creator – the power and 
sustenance that permit them to come into being and remain in being‘76. In other words, the 
physical world does not have an independent existence of its own. Everything which exists is 
directly linked to God in such a way that if cut off from God it ceases to exist. The belief in 
God as the continuous, and independent, cause for everything in existence is a significant 
feature of Islam, and has implications on the view on natural science. We will touch upon 
this point towards the end of chapter 6. 
 
Musavi Lari continues to dwell on the topic of ‗First Cause‘ in a way here that is interesting, 
but somewhat unique among the writers. More often, the simplest kalam arguments take a 
step further to include design. The complex order of creation testifies of a Creator, an 
external factor that has meant something about everything else. Abdulati concludes that 
‗[t]here must be a Great Force in the world, and in nature there must be a Great Artist. The 
true believers recognize this force of all forces and artist of all artists. The same believers and 
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enlightened people recognize this Artist and call him Allah or God.‘77  Musavi Lari argues 
that the precise system of the cosmos ‗bears witness to the existence of a source 
characterized by knowledge and power‘78. The world as it exists, as a ‗compendium of finely 
calculated causes and reasons‘79 indicates that there is a plan behind it, and not mere chance: 
‗The confused and incomprehensible brush strokes of a painting cannot be taken as the 
indication of a skilled artist, but precise strokes and designs with meaningful content are 
indeed evidence for the existence of a talented painter‘.80 
 
On a similar note, Nabil Haroun believes God‘s existence should be evident to any observer 
of nature: ‗[W]hat [does] a reasonable and honest reading of the physical world tells us about 
God[?] Read through the "book of nature" at any level, from the smallest subatomic particles 
to the single living cells, to the complex biological systems […] the universe at large: from 
our planet earth, to the solar and the galactic systems!‘81 Mawdudi sees the stars and 
heavenly bodies as ‗countless manifestations of God‘s divine power‘82 The universe is ‗in 
itself a testimony of the fact that its Planner, Creator and Ruler is an omnipotent Being with 
unlimited power[…], against Whom nothing in the universe dears to disobey.‘83 Zakir Naik 
makes use of the famous ‗watch argument‘ as first proposed by William Paley84: A stone on 
the road is just there and is rarely accounted for, but someone who stumbles upon a complex 
clockwork understands that it could not just have happened. If an atheist is asked ‗Who will 
be the first person who will be able to tell you the mechanism of this machinery?‘85 even the 
atheist will answer ‗the manufacturer‘86, says Naik. The observer of the stars, celestial beings 
believed to be the most perfect in creation, must see that universe is even more complex than 
a clock. To Naik, the mere existence of a complex universe counts as not only a suggestion, 
but proof of God‘s existence.  
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3.3.2.  The scientific miracles in the Qur‟an.  
 
In the literature there is a particular type of argument meant to prove that the Qur‘an has 
supernatural origin; the argument of the scientific miracles of the Qur‘an. The modern 
version of it stems from research done by French scholar Maurice Bucaille, who, in the 
process of examining the relationship between the Qur‘an and natural science, is to have 
made discoveries beyond what he could have expected
87
. El-Naggar points to what he calls 
the ‗cosmic verses‘88 in the Qur‘an. These verses are not as plain as the others, but their 
meaning will continue to develop, as human knowledge grows forever.
89
 Naturally, the 
Qur‘an is above human knowledge and also ‗ceaselessly inimitable‘.90 The quest to 
understand the hidden glory of the Qur‘an, then, involves closely exploring these cosmic 
verses. ‗Their meanings beautifully unfold with the gradual unfolding of human knowledge, 
generation after generation. Such scientific knowledge was limited at the time of revelation, 
but because of the cumulative nature of scientific knowledge, it grows with time.‘91 It is, he 
says, essential to employ all available scientific knowledge in every field of study referred to 
in the Qur‘an, in order to reach a correct understanding of the cosmic verses. This involves 
re-interpreting certain Qur‘anic verses in the context of their scientific connotation. The aim 
here, however, is not science. It is to leave the reader without a shred of doubt that God in 
fact does exist, however only the God. In El-Naggar‘s words; ‗The scientific inimitability of 
theGlorious  Qur‘an is […] a challenge through which we can prove to humanity that this 
Noble Book [was] revealed by the Creator of the universe fourteen hundred years ago to a 
prophet who could neither read nor write.
92
 As one interviewer of El-Naggar puts it, ‗No 
reasonable person can listen to this discussion and not believe in the revelations of the 
Qur‘an.‘93 
 
Zaikir Naik‘s method is similar to El-Naggar‘s. Naik also claims to avoid use of what he 
calls theories and propositions, only ‗scientific facts‘ are given status as knowledge. ‗Who 
                                                 
87
 Maurice Bucaille: „ L‟homme D‟ou Vient-il? Les Responses de la Science et des Ecritures Eaintes.‟ First 
edition (1981) „What is the Origin of Man? The Answers of Science and the Holy Scriptures‟. First English 
edition 1982. Also available as: „The Bible, the Qur‟an and Science. The Holy Scriptures Examined in the Light 
of Modern Knowledge‟. New York, 2003. 
88
 El-Naggar 2006:4. 
89
 El-Naggar(1) 2006:8 
90
 El-Naggar(1) 2006:8. Related to the doctrine of inimitability, found in the Qur‘an itself. Sura 112. 
91
 El-Naggar(1) 2006:9. 
92
 El-Naggar(1) 2006:19. 
93
 El-Naggar(1) 2006:68. 
22 
 
else could have known this?‘ Naik asks rhetorically. It is believed that all knowledge is 
guided by the Divine. Any misguidance must be from Satan or due to human ignorance. 
Natural science has now, with certainty, confirmed a set of facts. Correlation of facts and 
lack of contradictive statements equals proof. Philips reasons along the same path about the 
Qur‘an. It is ‗free from inexplicable contradictions‘94 , and thus fulfils the criteria of being 
‗the divine word of God‘95.  
 
The object of scientific interpretation of revelation is to prove that the source of revelation is 
divine. We may ask then: does the argument of the scientific inimitability of the Qur‘an not 
already presuppose the existence of anything ‗divine‘ at all? What does this have to do with 
proving God‘s existence? El-Naggar and Zaik‘s argument is this: The fact that such a 
‗miraculous‘ book exists is enough proof to conclude that there must also be a God who 
exists. The argument is linked to the doctrine of the pre-existence of the Qur‘an. Scripture is 
believed to be mirrored in the whole of creation. Since there is such an evident match 
between these, the source of information about both must be one and the same. There must 
be ‗someone‘ behind the Qur‘an and it must be that same ‗someone‘ who is responsible for 
the earth‘s existence. Truth can ultimately only have one source and that source must by 
definition be God. The argument is also related to the traditional doctrine of inimitability, 
which generally says that the style in which the Qur‘an is written is beyond what any human 
being can produce. Since no human being can produce anything like the Qur‘an, let alone 
any of the cosmic verses, they must come from the next logical level, namely the 
metaphysical realm. It is also relates to the design argument described above. It is with a 
book as it is as with a clock. Even an atheist will have to agree that a book does not ‗just 
happen‘, or evolve naturally. Something so perfect and orderly can not have been made by 
humans. It must be from the metaphysical realm. The more ‗miraculous‘ the Qur‘anic 
passage the better the indication of divine origin. And the more scientific the argument 
sounds, the more plausible it is considered. If the Qur‘an is proven to have divine origin, then 
consequently it must be free from contradictions. Since the cosmic verses are from God, the 
other verses relating to worship, ethics and the afterlife must be from God also.  
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Naik and El-Naggar‘s conclusions have been criticised both by scientists and religious 
scholars
96
. But here that is not the point. The point is first, their strong belief in scientific 
progress, or perhaps more precisely, the status scientific progress is believed to have among 
their audience. Second, it is the conviction that modern scientific discoveries can not only be 
proved compatible with the Qur‘an, but are already mentioned in it. The precedence of the 
Qur‘an, in referring to a specific aspect of science, becomes a material proof of its scientific 
inimitability. A popular example is the Big Bang theory, which remains a theory all the while 
experimental science cannot promote it to the level of certainty
97
. Or, as Naik puts it: ‗no 
scientist could be a direct witness at the time of creation.‘98 Yet, as the reference made to the 
Big Bang in the Qur‘an attributes precedence to the Qur‘an, it establishes enough support to 
rise the Big Bang theory to the level of certainty. As we have seen, each of the premises of 
the argument of the scientific inimitability of the Qur‘an can be derived from the Qur‘an 
itself. In other words, the whole argument amounts to circular reasoning. Scripture may be 
used as hermeneutical key if the aim is to understand the Qur‘an as a text, or Islam as a belief 
system. But presented as ‗objective‘99 proof, it may still fail to convince the ‗reasonable 
person‘100.  
 
 
3.4. Conclusive remarks. 
 
‗Does God exist?‘ may be posed as a philosophical question as a starting point, but it is not 
treated as such throughout the discourse. One will find few, if any, fully developed 
philosophical arguments. Notably, arguments are not presented as ideas to be discussed, they 
are simply ‗proofs‘. Belief in God‘s existence is only ‗reasonable‘, ‗rational‘, ‗logical‘ or 
‗common sense‘. We have seen that arguments aimed at proving God‘s existence reflect a 
relatively positive view on the promises of modern science. Musavi Lari nevertheless refutes 
the materialists who say everything in existence can be studied empirically. Science 
illuminates a limited realm, not the whole of creation. He says ‗belief in the reality of the 
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unseen involves more than God
101‘, but as science is becoming more advanced, belief in God 
acquires a more scientific nature and a new kind of logic through the advancement of 
science. How does he relate his view on science to evidence of God‘s existence? Science 
highlights the principle of cause and effect as underlying all phenomena. And someone who 
believes in this ‗cannot possibly ignore the role of the most fundamental factor that is at work 
over and above all causes.‘102 Science is known to bear the potential to carry out good and 
evil, but it does not have the potential to lead man completely astray from God. On the 
contrary it is believed that the more one reveals the mysteries of nature, the closer one comes 
to the mysteries of God. 
 
From the perspective of the Christian philosophical tradition, Thomas Aquinas, as a 
proponent of natural theology, notes that God‘s existence can be known without reliance on 
faith and scripture. He also notes that His existence is not self-evident and does require 
argumentation
103
. Islamic theologians seem to go further in considering God‘s existence to be 
self evident. As Green puts it: ‗The fundamentals of what Islam teaches are so firmly rooted 
in reason and common sense is that it is virtually impossible to produce any effective 
argument against it‘104  Meanwhile, a defensive type of arguments is what this is about. And 
the fundamental ally called upon, is the reader or listeners own ability to reason. With this, 
one seeks to prove that it is not necessary to adhere to something blindly. The aim is to 
convince the reader ‗beyond the shadow of doubt‘105 that there is indeed a God. One does not 
operate with a special category of faith, or belief ‗in spite of‘. Not only does there happen to 
be a God, it could be nothing but the case. It seems that the very possibility that God should 
be non-existent is difficult to grasp. Any criticism against the arguments laid out is logically 
understood as a sort of atheism. To ignore the issue, or treat it merely on a philosophical 
basis seems unthinkable. Consequently, agnosticism does not make sense. Islam is, as the 
word suggests
106, an attitude to the question of God‘s existence more than it is a conclusion. 
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4. The nature of God. 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
W hen people believe that God exists, says Abdulati, they must learn his attributes and 
names
107
. Generally, he says, perfection and absolute goodness belongs to God and he has no 
flaws or wants. Specifically, one should know and believe the following: God is only One. 
He has no collaborator or son, He is neither begets nor is begotten. He is worshipped by all in 
eternity, He has no beginning or end, and no one is His equal.
108
 The Kalimah; la ilaha illa 
Allah, ‗there is no deity save God‘109 is believed to be, in the words if Shalabi, ‗an 
affirmation of complete transcendence; the most perfect articulation of what lies forever 
beyond the reach of language.‘110 It is pure monotheism. It declares the unity of the 
metaphysical ‗by implication more than by statement‘111  It implies that there is ‗no object 
worthy of worship save God, no conditioner of meaning apart from Him.‘112 The idea of 
unity is ‗the heart of the Muslim revelation‘113 it is the highest form of expression of the 
divine. It makes all the clouds of ignorance disappear, says Mawdudi, and enlightens history 
with the light of reality.
114
 According to Musavi Lari , it was the unity of God which was 
always  the primary reality revealed to the prophets. In the wake of Islam it led to a definitive 
way to worship God, with its precise rules and manifestations of a complete religion. Proper 
worship of the one God was the very purpose of the revelation of God‘s unity. ‗In fact, the 
basic preaching of all the Prophets was a call to monotheism, not a proof of the existence of 
God.‘115 
 
The focus of this chapter will be arguments meant to prove tawhid, that there is only one 
God, and the fundamental unity of God. I will refer to two major paths of reasoning which 
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typically follow the arguments on God‘s existence. The first of path of reasoning relates the 
principle of divine unity to cosmology and the ‗First Cause‘ argument. Further, a unity of 
creation is believed to reflect the unity of the Creator. The second path of reasoning attempts 
to show the connection between divine unity and Islam‘s claim of universal relevance. It 
relates to the fitra and ‗common sense‘ arguments in that it sees humanity as essentially 
being one race and one society. At the end of chapter four I will examine how tawhid is 
considered a prerequisite, admitted or not, for knowledge about God.  
 
 
4.2. The principle of divine unity. 
 
4.2.1. The First Cause must be One. 
 
The argument relates to the kalam argument, in that the existence of anything at all must 
have a First Cause.
116
 The existence of everything could only have one starting point, says 
Mawdudi. The First Cause can not be plural. He asks ‗Who can create and keep this majestic 
universe?
117
 He answers, Only He who is Lord of all
118
. He must have unlimited power, He 
must be beyond any flaw or weakness and no one can intervene in what He does. ‗Only such 
a Being can be the Creator, Supervisor and Steward of the universe.‘119  To Abulati it is a 
matter of coherence: ‗Nothing can work in an orderly manner without some sort of 
providence. This order must also have a plan, a Will and a Unified Spirit
120
. Shalabi also 
notes that the world can not be the product of mere chance. ‗The universe has a Cause and 
this Cause is One.‘121 The more one contemplates the subject, says Mawdudi, the clearer it 
becomes that all divine powers and attributes must be attributed to one and the same Being 
alone. Polytheism must be considered a form of ignorance; it cannot stand the scrutiny of 
reason. Moreover, it is a practical impossibility, for by denying this primary truth one 
bereaves the whole universe of its meaning and significance.
122
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Musavi Lari claims, along with Shalabi and Mawdudi, that the cause of everything else in 
existence can only be One. He refers to the First Cause also in terms of ‗the primary cause‘ 
to show that it is not linked to a specific time. It is the primary cause ‗by virtue of possessing 
perfect and unlimited being; […]and it contains no trace of mutability or change.‘123 It seems 
important for Musavi Lari to show that God does not have ‗modes‘ or is divided in any way, 
either in ‗persons‘ or in terms of the different attributes.  Also, he claims that since the First 
Cause stands in no need of a cause, it follows that no cause can intervene in it. God‘s unity is 
thus linked with God‘s sovereignty, which can not, by definition, be ‗intervened‘ with 
without compromising the principle of tawhid.  
 
 
4.2.2. The unity of God reflected in the unity of nature.  
 
Abdulati notes: ‗The world‘s great wonders and miracles are like open books where we can 
read about God.
124
  To Hameed the ‗perfect harmony existing among the Sun, the Moon, the 
planets, and the stars, declares the oneness of the Creator as well as the uniformity of the 
laws that govern them
125.  Indeed, he says, ‗all evidence in the universal order and nature 
unanimously proclaim the oneness of God. And believers are admonished to observe, study, 
and ponder over the phenomena of nature to be convinced of this stupendous fact‘126 How is 
it reasonable to draw such a conclusion just from observing the universe?  
 
According to Musavi Lari, the principle of divine unity is ‗at the center of the Muslim‘s 
curiosity regarding nature‘127. The Qur‘an encourages the human being to read its signs, ayat, 
which point toward the unity of God
128
. ‗From the earliest beginnings of Near Eastern 
thought, the cosmos is regarded as a unified entity which embraces the whole of being;‘ 129 
To Nasr, cosmic unity is a clear proof of divine unity
130
. If there were many deities, a lack of 
cooperation would necessarily occur, and the world would dissolve
131
. The world has not 
dissolved, on the contrary it obeys the laws of nature. From ‗the one divine principle from 
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which all being is derived, in whose overwhelming Presence all reality is dissolved[…] all 
conscious existence becomes a Surrender – Islam‘.132 All other powers are in reality subject 
to the omnipotent and omniscient lawgiver, the one God. In accordance with tawhid, Nasr 
sees the universe as an undividable whole. Everything in existence is believed to point 
towards the unity of God.  Nature itself is then to be interpreted in light of the principle of 
divine unity. In other words, the basis for tawhid is not grounded in anything, except in itself. 
However, to for example Bakar it is not regarded as problematic: ‗this idea acts as one of the 
principal guides to that inquiry, while at the same time being confirmed by it.‘133 Also Nasr 
adds that cosmic unity is a clear proof of divine unity once ‗the objective reality of cosmic 
unity‘134 has been accepted. Premises used to define God are used as proof of his nature. We 
will return to this toward at end of this chapter. But first, let us look at another, similar 
argument which also derives its premise from tawhid.  
 
  
4.3. One humanity and One God. The universality of Islam. 
 
From reading the sources, they seem to convey the notion that the unity of the Creator has its 
parallel in the unity of creation, and this includes humans in a special way: ‗There is only one 
God who created one race of human beings‘135. The principle of universality is typically 
opposed to Judaism
136, a ‗tribal religion‘137. What is believed to make Islam unique 
compared to other religions is that it does not have a connection with any distinct person, or 
land or people.
138
 Allah is not the god of Muslims only, or the Arabs, he is the God. This also 
means that in reality, there are no other gods. Shahul Hameed notes in an article on the 
universality of Islam, that it ‗should be evident to any thinking person that the very concept 
of universality, by definition, precludes any chance for ―differences or divisions among the 
powers‖ that control the universe. If there were more gods than one, there could be 
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differences — in fact, wars — among the gods‘139 Belief in tribal gods is an expression of 
polytheism, he says, and thus the nature of the gods excludes them from being trusted.  
 
Hameed concludes that One God, one humanity, and one religion for mankind is the 
foundation of Islam.‘140  ‗The Muslim believes in the unity of mankind when it comes to the 
source of creation, the origin of life and its final fate. The common origin of mankind is 
Adam and Eve, all humans belong with and have a part in this origin. As for the final fate, 
the Muslim has not the least of doubt that it is to God, the Creator that all humans will return 
to.
141
 Hameed further explains this ‗philosophical universalism'142. It claims that there are 
facts that are true for all people, at all times. In logic, he says, a proposition is said to have 
universality if it can be proved to be valid in all possible contexts without creating a 
contradiction. So, truth is considered to be universal if it is valid in all times and places. Such 
truth is known as 'absolute truth' or 'eternal truth'
143
. The principle of ‗one humanity‘ implies 
the existence of a unified morality governing society. [A] universal religion should be a 
complete religion, so that it does not leave the moral principles that should govern the affairs 
of humans to the whims and prejudices of any particular person or group. Islam is a complete 
way of life.
144
  
 
Abdulati also relates the unity of mankind to the unity of God and the unity of religion, and 
because the Muslim believes in all of these ‗he will believe in all God‘s messengers and 
revelation without discrimination.
145
 The principle of universality means that every human 
being is subject to the same truth about God and all humans are all eventually responsible 
before Him. Differences in race, colour, caste, wealth and power disappear. Abdulati calls the 
fraternity of all humans a ‗fundamental element in the value system of Islam‘146. It is also 
related to liberty and equality. According to Shalabi, it was Muslims who first got rid of race 
and caste systems.‘ And never has there been any consciousness of race in Islam, for the 
Qur‘an teaches that all are one family‘.147   
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The logic of the argument of the universality of Islam can easily be followed. However, the 
writers here seem to reason along the same path as with the arguments related to the 
scientific miracles of the Qur‘an. Certain knowledge is believed to be self-evident while it in 
fact can also be derived from specific religious scripture. The unity of humanity must be 
regarded as a presupposition on the same level as the unity of God. The principle of equality 
of all humans before God is a concept which can be derived from tawhid, which is exactly 
what the argument seeks to prove. As with the phrase ‗modern scientific discoveries‘, the 
authors seems to suppose that the concept of ‗one humanity‘ does not require additional 
verification. The paradigm appears to be that categories such as ‗race‘ or ‗caste‘ do not really 
exist. The idea is popular, but it can surely be traced to particular religious and philosophical 
currents. What is most interesting here, then, is perhaps the way it is simply drawn upon as 
proof in the context of the West. The main support for the premise of the argument, namely 
the oneness of humanity, seems to be that a number of people have simply discovered and 
accepted this. It is becoming a type of ‗common sense‘ also in the West. The unity and 
equality of humanity should be so evident to most, that it would, to quote Green again, be 
‗virtually impossible to come up with a reasonable argument against it‘148.   
 
 
4.4. The definition of God.  
 
Assuming there is a God, what is he like? Islamic authors of da‟wah literature would say: 
God is not like anything. He is unlike everything else. It is, however, believed to be possible 
to know something about his nature. One way in which man is believed to know something 
about God is through contemplating the words that describe God‘s attributes, such as Him 
being Omnipotent, Omniscient, Just and Merciful, among others.
149
  Yet, any reflections 
beyond mentioning God‘s names seem to revolve around the first, most basic principle: God 
is One. ‗[T]he blazingly simple truth of the Unity of God‘150 says Shalabi, is the principle of 
tawhid, the principle of Divine Unity. Then, what about God‘s names and characteristics? It 
seems that the Qur‘an is trusted to provide a sufficient answer once its status as revelation 
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has been accepted.  It is worth noting the absence of questions regarding God‘s ‗moral‘ 
attributes, as is often the case in Western philosophy of religion
151
. The style is generally not 
‗apologetic‘ in the sense that one tries to solve contradictions152 such as for example his 
Omnipotence and the problem of evil
153
. It is interesting to note that Islamic da‟wah authors 
do not seem at all concerned with explaining or proving that ‗God is good‘. What they do 
seek to prove is that God is One, and that it is Islam which represents true monotheism. 
 
The belief in God‘s existence and God‘s oneness are inseparable. In other words, what they 
do is argue for the case that there is no other god, but this Allah, and that this is the One who 
chose Muhammad as messenger. Of all the things God is, he is essentially One. Musavi Lari 
seeks to prove God‘s existence on the basis of man‘s fitra. Meanwhile, what Mawdudi calls 
‗the age of ignorance‘154 still stands all the while man continues to worship lesser deities in 
addition to the highest deity. Even the notion of the One God contains some traces from the 
age of ignorance. ‗Some imagine that he has a body, like humans.‘155 Mawdudi is here 
referring to the Christian doctrines of Trinity and the nature of Christ. He says the one God 
can only be transcendent. Creation and creator can not mix. The sin of shirk, to associate God 
with other things, has been called the negation of Tawheed.
156
 Also, to Green, the real 
problem is not that Christians do not believe in God, but that they actually attribute to the 
Creator some powers or ‗things‘ that in fact belongs to creation. He asks: ‗What is it to say 
that someone is God and man at the same time? It is a contradiction. It is not a paradox, he 
says, it is ‗an impossibility by definition‘157. Christians are saying: ‗you are going to go to 
hell for ever if you do not believe in something that is impossible.‘158 So I have to believe 
something impossible without proof
159
 Christians say ‗God can do anything‘160. Yes, says 
Green, but not if it contradicts his nature. It does not make sense.  
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In light of tawhid, Greens argument is reasonable enough: God can not be both God and man 
and still be God. God can only be one, if he is three, then he is simply not God. Green does 
not believe it is necessary to prove that the divinity of Jesus and consequently the doctrine of 
Trinity are false. When something is impossible by definition, the burden of proof lies with 
those who claim the impossible. As already mentioned, the literature analysed here there is a 
particular focus on the simplicity of Islam‘s doctrine. Emphasizes is also its consistency. 
Also with reference to the Christian tradition, Philips devotes a major bulk of his polemic 
argument to show that the Bible could not be a word from God. His simple criterion is this: if 
the Bible is the word of God we could expect it to be consistent. The One who has all 
knowledge simply can not contradict himself.  The Cause of and origin of truth must 
ultimately be in unity.   
 
 Is tawhid recognized as revealed doctrine or reasonable prerequisite to proper belief in God? 
It is both. Revelation, both in terms of Scripture and of signs in nature, is understood to be 
full of references to God‘s unity and oneness. Meanwhile, the principle of tawhid is 
recognized as a prerequisite to accepting the Qur‘an as revelation. We must identify tawhid 
as an overarching epistemological paradigm in Islam. For Islamic thought, the realisation of 
the existence of the One transcendent God is above all other knowledge, and the more one 
contemplates it, the deeper the conviction that this is the point of reference for of all 
knowledge. Revelation is thus not only knowledge about the divine, it is knowledge about 
anything.  In any field of science, including the humanistic sciences, one will find that it all 
points toward the truth in la ilaha illa‟Llah161. All truth is believed to have the same 
coherent, unified source. Any ad hoc claims which would draw the human mind away from 
contemplating God‘s existence and unity are not only a sin, they are reasonably impossible.  
 
We have seen that arguments proving the principle of divine unity clearly amount to circular 
reasoning. We have also seen that it is not regarded as a problem. How can circular reasoning 
not be seen as problematic in the search for objective truth? The arguments seem to fall back 
on the one premise which is not questioned; the principle of divine unity. Then we have to 
ask: How is an argument believed to persuade the reader if it hardly touches upon its 
premise, which is exactly the place where disagreement is found? The last question has been 
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perhaps the single most puzzling feature of this encounter. It is to be hoped that a more 
systematic study of the concept of that which is called ‗divine knowledge‘ will bring us 
closer to an understanding. How does knowledge about God in terms of rational thinking 
relate conceptually to knowledge from God in terms of revelation? This leads us to the next 
chapter. 
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5. The acquisition of divine knowledge  
 
(The conceptual framework according to Bakar.) 
 
 
5.1. Introduction. 
 
 
Until now we have investigated arguments presented in favor of God‘s existence and unity. 
They show us that the human being is believed to relate to knowledge about God both by 
rational thought and by observation. The existence of God may be accepted merely based on 
an affirmation of the existence of the universe. In other instances a proper description of the 
concept ‗God‘ is believed to be enough to conclude that he exists. While authors appeal to 
the reader‘s own ability to reason, their arguments are closely bound to Islamic revelation. 
Thus, their arguments often amount to circular reasoning, leaving the premises untouched. 
This does not, however, seem to disturb those who present them.  It is not only presumed that 
God can be known objectively, it is also believed that his existence and unity can be 
defended objectively. My concern in this chapter is not to make judgements of the validity of 
particular arguments. In order to understand them better we need first to approach them on an 
epistemological level, by looking more closely at the methodology behind them: How is the 
(process of) revelation, in terms of truth from God, believed to relate to the human mind as 
objective knowledge? 
 
One author, Malay scholar Osman Bakar, provides not only arguments, but a comprehensive 
methodology to accompany them. In this chapter, I will present relevant aspects of this 
methodology, which he claims to derive from classic Islamic thought. 
 
 
5.2. An Islamic methodology.  
 
Bakar‘s devotion for Islam and his agenda to make Islam intellectually acceptable places him 
in a category similar to the other writers. As a methodological starting point, upholds a 
commitment to the revelation in the Qur‘an. He says the Muslim mind which accepts an 
35 
 
Islamic view of the cosmos has, prior to that, already accepted Revelation as the highest 
source of knowledge
162
. What makes him unique in relation to the other writers is their 
genuine effort to provide a conceptual framework which guides the reader a step further 
beyond the mere ‗proofs‘. Bakar derives several of his conclusions from works of Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr, a well known authority in Islamic scholarship. As philosophers concerned with 
religion and the spiritual dimension especially, they do occasionally reveal a favor toward 
mysticism. What makes their contribution of interest here is their combined commitment to 
Islamic revelation and true scholarship.  
 
Bakar sees the need for an epistemological paradigm that can provide a more coherent view 
of the world continuously revealed by modern science
163
. The usual Muslim response to 
modern science has been to seek to demonstrate that Islamic civilization preceded the 
modern West in the application of the Scientific Method
164
 and exerted influence upon it. In 
Bakar‘s view the ‗so-called Scientific Method‘ should by no means be accepted as the sole 
path to knowledge. Its present epistemological foundation is after all in itself a conscious 
rebellion against, and rejection of the idea of, revelation. The result has on the one hand 
become a theoretical anarchism of philosophical contradictions. On the other hand, the 
widespread use of experimentation has lead to an empiricism which regards sensual 
experience as the source of all knowledge. Modern science is therefore in a current state of 
confusion as well as a spiritual reductionism which impoverishes the natural order. Contrary 
to the modern scientific method, Islam is guarded against any such ‗philosophical 
deviations‘165.  Bakar uses the term ‗science‘166 ‗in a comprehensive sense of an organized 
body of knowledge that constitutes a discipline with its distinctive goals, basic premises and 
objects and methods of inquiry‘167. Islamic science embraces a wider meaning than does the 
modern discipline of the same name. In accordance with an Islamic view on the hierarchy of 
the sciences, it includes the supreme knowledge of tawhid as a metaphysical science - the 
most universal science since it deals with the ‗Supreme Reality‘168 which contains all things. 
It is only through a revival of traditional Islamic sciences that a consciousness of this 
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‗richness of reality‘169 can be brought about. Faithfulness to tawhid spares one of the 
‗unfortunate and intellectually precarious situation‘170 of having different modes of 
knowledge compete one another and having to affirm one over the other. This is not so say 
that Islamic science consists of one single methodology. Rather, it consists of different 
methods in accordance with the nature of the subject in question and modes of understanding 
that subject
171
. In other words an Islamic methodology amounts to a coherent and unified 
view of a multiplicity of methodologies. The various sciences must be regarded as bodies of 
evidence to the principle of divine unity. All possible paths to knowledge belong within one 
and the same epistemological scheme ‗from ratiocination and interpretation of sacred 
Scriptures to observation and experimentation‘172. Each available path has its legitimate role 
to play as long as it points toward tawhid.  
 
How, according to Bakar, is this revival of Islamic science is to take place? Islamic science 
must be viewed as an independent scientific and intellectual tradition, but one that issues 
forth from ‗the Quranic view of reality and of man‘s place in that reality‘173.  As asserted by 
Ibn Sina, true science, says Bakar ‗is that science which seeks the knowledge of the essences 
of things in relation to their Divine Origin‘174. In the Islamic tradition different approaches 
have been made. According to Al-Farabi‘s (870-950) classification, one group of scholars are 
those who claim divine revelation as superior even to the knowledge gained by the best of 
human intellects
175
. Another group defends their theology by showing that scientific 
knowledge is in harmony with the religious texts
176
. Bakar does not approve of pure 
rationalism, in which God is treated merely as an abstract philosophical concept. Neither 
does he approve of literalism, where any kind of rationalism of faith is prohibited. In order to 
reach true knowledge about God, he must be approached as the Reality Who is the 
fountainhead and basis of revealed religion
177
. To speak of a true Islamic methodology is to 
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speak of all possible ways or methods by means of which man can gain knowledge of this 
Reality.
178
   
 
 
 
5.3. How revelation relates to the human soul. 
 
 
Because it is omniscient God who reveals and the human being who gains knowledge, the 
question of methodology is ‗conceptually inseparable from the ultimate purpose of human 
cognition‘179. In order to know what God has revealed it is essential to also know the truth 
about man‘s intellectual creativity.  How, according to Bakar, is the principle of tawhid and 
the hierarchy of knowledge relative to the human being? An Islamic methodology of 
knowledge deals precisely with the essential relationship between the hierarchy of man‘s 
faculties of knowing and the hierarchy of the Universe, and with the principles governing 
that relationship. Now, let us turn specifically to how revelation relates to the human intellect 
as knowledge.  
 
 
5.3.1. The hierarchy of beings and the corresponding faculties of knowing  
 
How is knowledge of the divine possible?  A central thesis to Islam is that it is in God‘s 
nature to create and to reveal. God desires to be known. His creation is also his revelation, 
otherwise it would be impossible for him to be known. The human is the central being in 
creation, ‗by virtue of the supernatural character of his intellect and its cognitive powers, and 
by virtue of being a universe in miniature‘180. Man has been equipped with all that is 
necessary for him to know what he needs to know. According to Bakar, there is a lot of 
literature in Islamic intellectual history that deals with the methodology of knowledge. The 
different schools, such as the Peripatetic, the Illuminationist, the Transcendent theosophy, as 
well as those of gnosis (mainly identified with the Sufis) have touched upon methodology, 
from different perspectives. But, says Bakar, ‗all of them are categorical and united in their 
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view of asserting the hierarchic nature of both man‘s faculties of knowledge and the 
Universe.‘181 To speak of methodology is, therefore, to speak of man as the subject that 
knows. This concept of a hierarchy of Reality is accepted as an axiomatic truth, ‗thanks to the 
teaching of revelation‘182.  Each level of Reality has a corresponding mode of knowledge in 
man. Man is seen as the subjective pole of knowledge and consists of all the faculties and 
‗the hierarchy of the faculties and powers of knowing within the human knowing subject‘183. 
These faculties and powers constitute multiple levels of consciousness, but within a 
hierarchical and unified totality. The objective pole of knowledge is the world of begins that 
are knowable and known. Its ontological principle is the Divine Intellect or Pure Being
184
.  
 
The relationship between the objective and subjective poles of knowledge involves an idea of 
a one-to-one correspondence between the two poles, where ‗every level of cosmic existence 
has its corresponding existence in man‘185.The acquisition of knowledge is thus a process of 
intellectual and spiritual realization of the subjective experience of Reality
186
. In other words, 
knowledge is made possible through the actualisation of possibilities latent within the 
intellect
187
. But, Bakar adds, the actualization is possible only if the intellect, as the 
subjective revelation in man were to submit itself to the Qur‘an, the objective revelation. 
How, more specifically, does this process of actualization of knowledge take place? The next 
paragraph provides a more in-depth description of the relationship between the objective and 
subjective poles of knowledge. It will also serve as an example of how Bakar uses classic 
Islamic philosophy in support of his methodology.  
 
 
5.3.2 Al-Farabi‟s(870-950)  psychology and the Active intellect.  
 
According to al-Farabi the human being gains knowledge either through sensation, the 
imaginative faculty or the rational faculty, corresponding to the body, soul and spirit
188
. The 
rational faculty ranks highest in the hierarchy of the subjective pole of knowledge, ‗for it 
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rules or orders all the others‘189. The function of the rational faculty, as the subjective 
revelation, is to receive the forms of intellectual objects, which Bakar calls ‗intelligibles‘, in 
some instances intelligible forms
190
. The hierarchy of these intelligibles are as follows: 
Intelligibles are immaterial forms, free from matter and material attachments. There are two 
kinds of intelligibles ‗imprinted on the rational soul‘.191 Of the first kind are forms that at 
some point were matter, but became abstracted from it. They were potential intelligibles, but 
are now actual intelligibles. The second kind of intelligibles are not, and never were, in 
matter. These refer to the First Cause and a whole hierarchy of intelligences situated below it. 
Of this second kind of intelligibles, the Active intellect is placed lowest in rank. Bakar 
further explains the role of the Active intellect: The human being possesses intelligence in a 
latent form, a potential intelligence. The potential intelligence becomes actual intelligence 
through several stages. The first stage Bakar calls habitual intelligence, and occurs when the 
first intelligible forms are present in the soul. The second state is called the actual intellect, 
which is reached after full actualization has taken place in the mind. The third state is a 
complete realisation of the actual intellect, and is called acquired intelligence. The final stage 
of the actualisation of potential intelligence is the Active intellect, ‗this supra-individual 
intellect which transcends this highest level of human intellect, and which renders this whole 
process of intellectual actualization possible
192.‘ It is the illumination of the Active 
intellect
193
 which enables the various faculties and powers of knowing to be fully functional 
and receptive to revelation. The potential intellect becomes actual intellect, understood as 
knowledge, according to the intelligible forms, or aspects of Reality it has received. 
 
Al-Farabi identified the Active intellect with the holy spirit (Ruh al-Quds), or Gabriel, the 
archangel of Divine revelation. He also called it ‗a separate form of man‘194 or true man. 
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Bakar himself refers to something he calls ‗the Divine Intellect or the Logos‟195‘in which the 
Reality of the Holy Qur‘an resides‘196.  The Divine Intellect is also the source of the spiritual 
substance of the human intellect. Bakar, with al-Farabi, presupposes a match between God‘s 
revelation and the human intellect, or the human intellect as it can be. The key to real 
knowledge is neither independent rational thinking, nor unguided sense perception
197
. Islamic 
epistemology affirms that the ultimate key to true knowledge is supra-rational perceptions. 
Yet, it is clear that all human thought can not be attributed to illumination of the Active 
intellect or its spiritual substance stemming from the Divine Intellect. How is the human 
mind to reach certainty about which thoughts must be attributed to human error, and which 
can be attributed to divine guidance, if indeed such a thing exists? How does an Islamic 
methodology resolve the issue of doubt? 
 
 
 
5.3.3. The place of doubt: Al-Ghazzali‟s (1058-1111) epistemological crisis and its solution. 
Bakar‘s account of al-Ghazzali‘s198 philosophical system is based on his autobiographical 
work Deliverance from Error, or al-Munqid
199
. Al-Munqid was partly written as the result of 
a methodological crisis that al-Ghazzali found himself in, both due to personal afflictions and 
the intellectual environment at the time
200
. Most interesting here is not to understand the true 
nature of al-Ghazzali‘s crisis or the various interpretations of it, but Bakar‘s explanation of it. 
Bakar is primarily concerned with the philosophical meaning and significance of this 
Ghazzalian doubt. It was al-Ghazzali‘s natural intellectual disposition to grasp the real 
meaning of things
201
. He wanted certain and infallible knowledge, defined by Bakar as ‗that 
knowledge which is completely free from any error or doubt, and with which the heart finds 
complete satisfaction.‘202 Ghazzali‘s own definition is ‗that in which the thing known is made 
so manifest that no doubt clings to it, nor is it accompanied by the possibility of error and 
deception, nor can the mind even suppose such a possibility‘203. Al-Ghazzali approved the 
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aim of kalam,
204
 as it is rooted in the Qur‘an, but he was critical of certain aspects. The 
methods of kalam could not satisfy his thirst for ‗knowledge of the reality of things.‘ He thus 
began to question taqlid, the ‗uncritically inherited religious belief‘205 as a manner of 
acquiring ideas. But, says Bakar, this must not be understood as if al-Ghazzali evern 
advocated complete abandonment of it. It must be seen in the context of his quest for the 
highest level of certainty. He was dissatisfied with taqlid because it could not quench his 
intellectual thirst
206
.  Ghazzali admits taqlid to be acceptable, even necessary, for ‗the simple 
believers whose minds are free of the kind of intellectual curiosity one finds on philosophers 
and scientists, and who are therefore content to accept things based on the authority of the 
experts.‘207   
 
In his quest for this true and infallible knowledge, al-Ghazzali had relied on sense-based data 
and rational data, which belong in the category of primary truths
208
. At one point when his 
reliance on sense-data had been shattered, he sought refuge in the certainty of rational data. 
Even these were refuted, yet not in the same way reason itself had refuted the claims of the 
senses. According to Bakar, Al-Ghazzali‘s reason was reminded of the possibility of another 
judge superior to itself. If this judge of reason were to reveal itself it would disprove the lies 
of reason, just as reason had given lie to the judgment of the senses
209
. In the event that it 
does not reveal itself, Bakar notes that ‗the mere fact of the non-appearance of this other 
judge does not prove the impossibility of its existence‘. Bakar is not talking about the 
existence of God, but the possibility of another kind of perception beyond reason. It was 
through this discovery that al-Ghazzali ended up refuting the rationalists, who claimed that 
knowledge of God ought to be acquired through rational thinking removed from revelation. 
He said, ‗whoever thinks that the unveiling of truth depends on precisely formulated proofs 
has indeed straightened the broad mercy of God‘210. Bakar suggests further that the end of his 
doubt was of a spiritual nature. He ‗sought the light of certainty and that knowledge which 
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guarantees salvation‘211, and he found that light in Sufism It was the light that God cast into 
his breast that resolved his epistemological crisis.  
 
Bakar calls al-Gahzzali‘s doubt, which lasted only two months, a disease of skepticism and a 
mysterious malady of the soul
212
. His epistemological crisis was ‗none other than the inner 
tussle or tensions‘ between his soul‘s rational faculty and the supra rational faculty, the 
intuitive faculty. His doubt was not of a spiritual nature, but a methodological one. ‗His 
problem was one of finding the rightful place for each of the human faculties of knowing 
within the total scheme of knowledge, and, in particular, of establishing the right relationship 
between reason and intuition, as this latter term is traditionally understood.‘213 
 
Scholars have cited al-Munqid suggesting that Al-Ghazzali anticipated Descartes (1596-
1650) and his method of doubt. Was a method of doubt central in al-Ghazzali‘s 
epistemology? No, says Bakar. His doubt does not reflect a skeptical attitude as that of 
modern western philosophy. There is nothing to be found in this that is comparable to 
Descartes‘ assertion that it is necessary once in one‘s life to doubt of all things, so far as it is 
possible
214
. Bakar concludes that ‗if man is able to doubt it is because certitude exists‘215. 
Thus, the true nature of al-Ghazzali‘s crisis was not of truth itself, but of conflicting modes 
of knowing and accepting truth. He did not fall into the above mentioned philosophical 
temptation of the agnostics and the relativists
216
. His quest was to find the light of certainty, 
not an exercise in religious subjectivism or an act of disillusionment with objective reality. 
Al-Ghazzali was drawn to the highest objective reality that is
217
. He had doubts about the 
reliability of his rational faculty in the face of certain assertive manifestations of the 
intuitive faculty. Yet, it was never cut off from revelation and faith. ‗Philosophical certainty 
is of no value if it is not accompanied by submission to the truth and by the transformation 
of one‘s being in conformity with that truth‘218.  
Al-Ghazzali‘s doubt must, in Bakar‘s view be placed in the context of his environment and 
‗the whole set of opportunities which Islam ever places at the disposal of man in his quest 
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for certainty.‘219 The problem of diversity at the time did not lead to ‗the kind of relativism 
that is rampant in modern times‘220. On the contrary it lead to the search for the inner reality 
of human nature, that is man‘s primordial nature, man‘s fitra, which on the earthly plane 
becomes the receptacle for the multiplicity of religious forms and expression. Bakar returns 
to the principle of the hierarchy of the faculties of the human soul: Al-Ghazzali‘s doubt was 
in reality none other than an ‗inner tussle or tension between [the soul‘s] rational faculty and 
another faculty which mounts an appeal to the former...‘221 His doubt was generated not 
from ‗below‘ but suggested from ‗above‘. It was removed ‗not through the power of reason, 
but from ‗above‘ as a result of the light of divine grace, which restores to each faculty of 
knowledge its rightful position and its validity and trustworthiness at its own level.‘222  
 
 
5.4. The principle of divine unity and its methodological consequences 
 
5.4.1. Religious consciousness the quest for objectivity. 
Bakar‘s methodology of knowledge relates to the science of revelation, Islamic gnosis, rather 
than the science of fiqh, or jurisprudence. Although an integral religious tradition 
encompassing all aspects of life, he views Islam is as essentially a religion of knowledge, as 
the central means to salvation of the soul
223
. The different intellectual schools in Islam have 
touched upon the science of revelation from different perspectives, but are categorical and 
united, he says, in their view in asserting the hierarchic nature of both man‘s faculties of 
knowledge and the Universe
224
. An Islamic methodology is one which does not separate 
religious belief from scientific knowledge. The scientific spirit of the Islamic world is 
fundamentally rooted in religious consciousness. It makes the quest for objective knowledge 
different from that in the West, both religiously and historically speaking.  Bakar further 
explains that which he calls the ‗conceptual relationship between scientific objectivity and 
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religious consciousness‘225. First, what does he mean by ‗religious consciousness‘?  
Religious consciousness is essentially the consciousness of tawhid. The principle of Divine 
unity lies at the core of Islamic, or as Bakar would put it, the Muslim world view. The 
scientific spirit is not opposed to the consciousness of tawhid, but in an integral part of it. 
The consciousness of tawhid involves an acceptance of ‗the objective reality of cosmic 
unity‘226. It means on one hand that nature is made up of many levels of reality. On the other 
hand it means that there is a unity of nature in that it ‗must manifest the oneness of its 
metaphysical source and origin religiously called God.‘227  
As we have seen in analyzing the arguments, the unity of nature is in itself regarded as a 
proof of Divine unity. Bakar himself notes the circular reasoning in this: ‗The Muslim 
conviction that whatever truths or knowledge they were to discover about nature could not be 
opposed to the teachings of their sacred Book comes from that book itself.‘228 He does not 
however conclude that this kind of reasoning makes a claim scientifically problematic. Any 
methodology, he claims, is determined by the particular world view accepted a priori by the 
scientific collectivity in question.
229
 According to Bakar, then, modern science is no more 
objective than Islamic science. Objectivity is an essential element also of the Muslim 
scientific spirit. Muslim scholars, beginning in the ninth century CE, were already in the 
possession of a scientific attitude and a scientific frame of mind, which they had inherited 
from the religious sciences. Among their ‗most outstanding‘ features were a ‗passion for 
truth and objectivity‘, a ‗general respect for fully corroborated empirical evidence‘ and ‗a 
mind skilled in the classification of things‘230. The sense of objectivity, understood as 
referring to the qualities of impartiality, disinterestedness and justice[…] is inseparable from 
the religious consciousness of tawhid‘231. Man is capable of objectivity because, in principle, 
he has been endowed with these qualities. In fact, man desires and needs objectivity because, 
as created in the image of God, he wishes to emulate these qualities, which are in fact not just 
human, but also divine.  
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A second principle of objectivity is the principle of public or collective verification
232
. The 
Islamic point of view differs from modern world in this matter. Something does not become 
objective simply because it is verifiable by many, says Bakar. Islamic intellectual tradition 
speaks of objectivity on the higher planes of human consciousness. There are many levels of 
objective truth. Corresponding to each level of truth there is a particular form of verification 
or proof involving the particular faculty of knowing through which that objective truth is 
recognized.
233
 Further, ‗[o]bjectivity is also possible in the domain of non-empirical 
knowledge, such as in religious and spiritual knowledge or in philosophical and metaphysical 
knowledge‘234. This is precisely, he says, because all men possess the higher faculties of 
knowledge. Objectivity in its highest sense belongs to the intellectual order. It is here, that 
man is able to intellectually distinguish between the Absolute and the relative, or discern 
what is God and what is other than God
235
. 
 
Objective scholarship in the Islamic sense is, in other words, of religious significance. In 
modern scholarship it is confined to the empirical or experimental domain, while in Islam 
objectivity speaks to the ‗higher planes of the human consciousness‘236as well. In Bakar‘s 
view ‗modern scholarship has yet to show that by discarding religion from its worldview, it 
can attain a higher standard of impartiality, universality, and justice than had been 
demonstrated in religiously based scholarship, especially traditional Islamic scholarship.‘237 
In the Islamic world, the use of reason was never cut off from faith in divine revelation. 
Generally, they affirmed the idea of superiority to divine revelation over human reason. 
Thus, the use of logic did not lead to a secular rationalism which ‗rebels against God and 
religion‘238. Logic, Bakar claims, was never understood as being opposed to religious faith. 
Rather, a form of logic was developed within the framework of the religious consciousness 
of the transcendent. Logic is thus related to wisdom
239
. In their use of logic they were 
concerned with clarity and consistency, aware that logic can lead to both truth and error. But 
used correctly by an intellect that is not corrupted by ‗the lower passions‘, logic itself may 
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lead to the truth. In this way, Muslim scholars were able to combine the spirit of 
experimentation with a ‗strong religious awareness of the Transcendent.‘240  
 
 
5.4.2. The creative mind. 
 
What is, in Bakar‘s view, the true nature of human creativity? We can define creativity as the 
origin of ideas, concepts and theories Modern science, he says, resolves the question mostly 
on the level of physics and chemistry in the human brain or consciousness.  The divine origin 
of man‘s creative ideas is denied and the question of creativity is reduced to the concept of 
the human genius. And as a consequence, modern science wrestles with problems on a 
horizontal level, where no proper solution can be found. Bakar seems to have noted that this 
has already led scientists, especially physicists to look for new and meaningful explanations. 
In some instances they involve acceptance of Scripture. According to Bakar, Muslims 
maintain that the ‗uncreated reality of the Holy Qur‘an resides in the Divine Intellect. The 
individual human intellect, the universe and the Quran all have one and the same 
metaphysical basis, ‗the Twin source of Revelation and Intellectual intuition‘241.Bakar calls 
for a stronger integration of tafsir, Quranic exegesis or interpretation, into science. The 
operative aspect of tafsir is the rational faculty, or reason. Its power is analysis and 
ratiocination
242
. Its tool is logic. Bakar points out, again, that logic does not depend on the 
validity or the premises, but rather the correctness of its syllogistic reasoning. The role of 
revelation, he says is to provide the premises of rational or logical arguments. As opposed to 
a western type of rationalism, the domain of tafsir does not extend beyond the external 
meanings of the Qur‘an. A Western rationalism is false not because it seeks to express reality 
in rational mode, as far as this is possible, but because it seeks to embrace the whole of 
reality in the realm of reason
243. ‗In tafsir, the rational faculty is placed at the disposal of 
faith or revelation in the sense that it is called upon to present and expound the content of 
Revelation in a rational manner to the best degree possible, whereas in modern thought it has 
been used to rebel against truth claims which lie outside its cognitive competence‘244.  
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As a consequence of this view, a central concern of Islam is with the protection and correct 
functioning of the human intelligence. Every rational thought, whether intuitive or subject to 
conscious reasoning is either in direct accordance with revelation or in direct opposition to it.  
Divine knowledge has an existence independently of the human mind. At the same time, 
being already imprinted on the rational faculty, it is an integral part of it. The correct use of 
the rational faculty, says Bakar, does not lead to the kind of rationalism found in the Western 
world. As is also claimed by Nasr, man‘s intellectual quest cannot be reduced to a defined 
method, but always involves an intuition, ‗a jump of a creative nature‘245. It is only through 
being receptive to ideas of higher levels of reality that true solutions can be found. This 
means, practically, that one may seek God‘s help in prayer in order to solve scientific and 
philosophical problems. However, as we have already seen reception of these higher ideas is 
possible only if the mind is illuminated by the Active Intellect. The human intellect must 
have already been illuminated by the light of faith, and touched by the grace issuing forth 
from revelation. It is upon submission to revelation at all levels that the intellect is enabled to 
actualize the potential knowledge ‗to the extent grace from revelation makes it possible‘246.  
 
 
5.4.3 Conclusive remarks. 
As with the authors whose arguments we have previously examined, the principle of Divine 
unity appears to be the ultimate definition of God. It seems that the reader is expected to 
accept this premise even prior to acceptance of the Quran as the word of God and 
Muhammad as the seal of Prophets. Once this premise has been accepted, and naturally so, 
one simply cannot but believe that the rest is truth. Al-Farabi emphasized the positive aspects 
of reason as ‗a ladder which leads one to the verities of revelation‘. The overview of his 
psychology serves to explain the distinction between intellect and reason.  
 
Al-Farabi‘s definition of intellect is ‗that by which a man understands‘247. To Bakar, the 
outcome of intellectual activity, in the form of knowledge is considered superior to the 
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process. Reason is not opposed to the intellect or to revelation if it is correctly used. Reason, 
in fact, should serve both the intellect and revelation.  The dichotomy is thus not between the 
empirical and the rational, but the sense-based and the religious consciousness, which judges 
and governs it. Truth, then, is not relative, it is considered Absolute in its origin, and all other 
truths relate to it in a hierarchy of Reality. Moreover, knowledge of this reality is not 
acquired in a ‗democratic‘ way, but according to a hierarchy of knowledge, of which the 
ultimate is divine knowledge. Knowledge is acquired through processes in the human soul, of 
which the rational faculty is placed hierarchically above the other. Yet, as we have seen, 
rationality in the Islamic sense is understood in terms of acquisition of knowledge from a 
source external to the human mind. To assert whether the knowledge acquired in fact truth 
and not merely inherited knowledge, which holds the possibility of both truth and error, is 
fundamentally linked to whatever level of certainty can be expected in the enquiry for truth 
about the topic in question. Knowledge about God is, by necessity, subject to a certain level 
of certainty affirmed in a traditional Islamic way of hierarchically ordering the universe, 
which is, in turn, believed to have its origin in divine revelation. 
 
It seems that no epistemological crisis would be able to alter the view on the Reality that 
Bakar describes. This is because this Reality is not external to the human intellect, the human 
intellect is rather an integral part of the Reality. Only God would be in a position to alter the 
reality of things. But he could not do so, unless he ceased to be God. In his analysis of 
Ghazzali‘s doubt, Bakar understands it as a tension between his rational faculty and his 
ability of supra-rational perception rather than a true epistemological crisis. By defining al-
Ghazzali‘s doubt as a methodological and not spiritual, he succeeds in reinforcing an Islamic 
worldview in stead of challenging its premises. Bakar‘s system of knowledge does leave 
room for the unknown, but in defined areas only. According to tawhid all thought, unless 
corrupted, leads to right belief. What Bakar does in his methodology is provide a 
comprehensive structural relationship between the objective reality of beings, the human 
mind and the Quranic revelation. God himself is surely incomprehensible for the human 
intellect, but to Bakar, there is nothing about his being that could imply an alteration of the 
hierarchy of beings, and consequently the system of knowledge about him.  
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6. Towards an understanding of the epistemological 
foundations of Islam. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction. 
 
This has so far been a systematic study of Islamic da‟wah literature in its efforts to prove 
God‘s existence and unity. The analysis has involved immediate, first hand reflection. The 
aim has been at first to identify types of arguments and the premises of the arguments. Next, 
we have seen the presentation of an Islamic methodology according to one scholar which 
claims to derive his methodology from traditional philosophy while maintaining the authority 
of the Qur‘an as divine revelation. In the process, questions have come up that need to be met 
with further reflection. Provided that the epistemology reflected in the arguments as well as 
Bakar‘s methodology is representative and intended, there seems to be little or no room for 
questioning circular argumentation. On the same token belief in God is presented as 
reasonable and rational. Authors show certain ambivalence in relation to modern knowledge. 
In the arguments meant to make the existence and unity of God reasonable and plausible, 
modern knowledge is called upon as support
248
. Bakar follows the other authors in that Islam 
is reasonable, but is more apt at recognizing a different type of reason than ‗the kind of 
rationalism and logicism one finds in the modern West‘249 
 
In the first part I will ask what may be the most approach to Islam as a religious 
phenomenon. I will do so by discussing insights from the study of religion, especially 
philosophy of religion, including phenomenology. I will ask questions of epistemology, such 
as what can be known as opposed to belief only, and how things can be known. From there I 
intend to reflect on Islam as knowledge, on concepts such as ‗objectivity‘, and ‗science‘, and 
how ‗knowledge‘ is believed to be an appropriate term in relation to God. Toward the end, 
while keeping in mind the specific arguments, I will reflect on how such arguments might be 
received in the context of a western intellectual tradition. Islam‘s encounter with a modern 
western world view potentially raises major issues that can not be resolved here. I will 
merely try to map out some of the most striking potential issues on a conceptual level. 
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There are also methodological concerns: From the beginning it has been essential to bear in 
mind the possible distinction between that which the author claims to do, and what he 
actually does. As also noted by Da Silva and Ore, a good analysis will have to involve 
interpretation of intent, as well as a reasonable interpretation of the analysis which follows
250
  
The literature has been demanding in this respect. At times the immediate reasonable 
response has been puzzlement. Apparent gaps between expressed intent and the way the 
argument is carried out, has made it necessary, and also worthwhile, to reflect beyond mere 
‗arrestments‘. The aim throughout the research has been to keep the analysis on a somewhat 
grounded level. Although, immediately questions arise as to exactly what the analysis is 
grounded in: Taking the literature seriously in terms of its own methodology, what does ‗a 
reasonable interpretation‘ of it amount to? A scholarly approach to Islamic arguments has to 
make use of the very set of tools which have been sought emulated in some respects and 
undermined in others. However, while adding to the complexity, it should not render them 
useless. The objective of this last chapter is not to choose one particular approach and 
maintain it as more valid than others, rather to reflect on the complexity of approaches. 
 
 
6.2. Islam as religion. 
  
6.2.1 Philosophical approaches to arguments.  
 
As a starting point we have defined ‗religion‘ as a world view claiming to have its origin in 
divine truths or divine revelation
251
. Rob Fisher describes the paradoxical relationship 
between faith and reason of the Christian West. On the one hand there is a commitment to 
faith as opposed to reason, on the other hand the use of philosophy in its defense, apologetics 
and expositions. Church Father Tertullian pointed to the essential incompatibility of 
philosophy and religion
252
. Even if they are not unrelated they must be kept apart, because 
one will eventually destroy the other. The link between them, however, focuses on 
rationality. A philosophical approach to religion, Fisher argues, is a rational process. Reason 
has a fundamental part to play in a religious tradition‘s reflection on its experiences and 
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beliefs. A religious tradition must also be able to use reason in producing logical arguments 
and making justifiable claims.
253
. A philosophical approach may focus especially on the 
intellectual dimension of religion
254
. A systematic study of the intellectual dimension is in 
practice identical with phenomenology of religion or comparative research on religion
255
. It 
is primarily concerned with describing and understanding the beliefs and practices held by 
members of a religious tradition. A philosophical approach may for example deal with 
problems of coherence and consistency involved in holding a concept of ‗God‘. It should be 
concerned with the grounds supporting religious belief, and the justification of religious 
claims to say anything of meaning about persons, the world and God.
256
 In this case the 
major challenge has been to logically interpret an already conceptualized Islamic belief 
system. Given that the material has been mostly aiming at making the reader accept a truth 
claim, another question comes up: the question of truth and falsity. 
 
 
6.2.2 Questions concerning truth and falsity.  
 
Can a study of Islam include asking questions of truth and falsity? As noted by da Silva and 
Ore, it can be useful to operate with a distinction between a genuine religious experience, 
deviation
257
and what is what is reasonably acceptable in the world of religions as well as the 
science of religion
258
. It is essential to understand religious phenomena in a way that 
adherents can recognize. Yet, seeking to verify religious claims is an important task of the 
various disciplines of religious science. Phenomenology of religion is, at base, a 
methodological approach, in which questions of truth and falsity is not the issue. The 
phenomenological approach to religion arose, on the one hand, out of a need for an 
alternative to an empirical-positivistic epistemology which cannot say anything on the 
possible ontological or metaphysical reference, i.e. the divine
259
 It rejects methodological 
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atheism, while such leads to an ontological reduction of religious phenomena
260
. It seeks on 
the other hand to avoid making normative theological judgments based on the theology of a 
particular context, for example within a given branch of Christian theology.  An empirical 
positivistic view on knowledge does not necessarily lead to an atheistic methodology. The 
consequence is rather, a methodology of agnosticism neither affirming nor denying 
transcendent beings and events.
261
 
 
 Rudolph Otto introduced the concept of ‗the holy‘262 in order to regard transcendence as an 
object of scientific study. Religion came to be understood as ‗expression of holiness‘263. 
Frank Whaling, while presenting theological approaches to religion
264
, goes further in 
advocating an approach which ‗takes the notion of transcendence seriously‘ and which 
involves the search for an overarching theology of religion.
265
 He understands the theologies 
of particular religions as contributions to a global theology of religions
266
. With this approach 
Whaling attempts to lift the study of religion out of the humanities and incorporate theology 
into a broader field of religious studies. It is interesting to note here a parallel to the type of 
arguments we have labeled ontological, where Islamic scholars in they make great efforts to 
describe fitra, the natural religiosity of the human being. Scholars in the field of religious 
studies, Whaling included, do not conclude that transcendent reality, ‗the holy‘ or ‗God‘ 
exists in its own right. In contrast, that is exactly what Islamic da‟wah s does. It seeks to 
draw a logical link between a universal recognition of God on an intentional level and Islam 
as the ultimate expression of this. It is in this context that the fitra arguments appear as less 
developed ontological arguments. It does not consider the possibility of a ‗mere‘ intentional 
existence. The actual existence of God is not made evident as opposed to his existence on an 
intentional level, but simply as a logical extension of it. We will return to this point later in 
the chapter.  
 
It was insights from the field of anthropology which introduced the recognition of religious 
belief as built on axioms. As noted by David Gellner it is sometimes impossible, when 
confronted with certain religious beliefs, to say that it makes no difference whether they are 
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true or false. ‗One cannot simply ‗bracket‘ them.‘ 267 If, for example, what is believed to take 
place really does so in a way that the researcher can relate to then the belief is 
‗straightforward‘268. If not, the researcher is compelled to ask ‗why they do not see that their 
beliefs might be false‘269. Evans-Pritchard noted, in a study among the Azande, that within 
their own way of thinking, their presuppositions ‗appeared entirely reasonable‘270. In the 
wake of this discovery, scholars continued to discuss how far all thoughts systems share this 
unfalsifiable quality, and whether supposedly ‗rational‘ scientific worldviews are any 
different. Throughout the research of arguments found in Islamic discourse, the aim has been 
to identify their premises. While avoiding a normative theological approach, we can point to 
the fact that possibility of error is hardly expressed, if at all. A type of argument which goes, 
‗I could be wrong here, but here are my reasons for believing such and such‘ is not 
expressed. We cannot actually conclude that the authors ‗do not see‘ the possibility of error 
in the matter of God‘s existence and nature, but we can conclude that it is not considered a 
necessary step in a persuasive argument.  
 
The conclusions in the wake of Evan-Pritchard‘s study have tended toward relativism, where 
religions, like science, are understood as systems of thought to the point of which to explain, 
control and predict the natural world
271
. As much as these conclusions attempt to understand 
religions on their own terms, they have also become controversial, as they logically relate to 
the idea that ‗primitive‘ religion is an inferior form of science. Viewing religious belief in 
terms of stages of societal evolution is an approach abandoned by most researchers today. It 
is still a popular notion, resulting for example in the idea that the Muslim world is presently 
living in the Middle Ages, or have not yet reached enlightenment
272
. Meanwhile, we are 
historically correct in saying that the phases leading up to the modern view on knowledge 
have not occurred in the same way in Islam. The Muslim world has maintained a more 
unified epistemology. Critical reasoning is welcomed in theory, but it has not lead to 
epistemological crises comparable to those in the West. For example, a parallel to Kant‘s 
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‗das Ding an sich‘, - the world as it appears through use of reason as opposed to the world as 
it is - is simply not expressed in Islamic literature. Instead model of knowledge prevails in 
which there is potential accuracy in the relationship between Reality as it is and the way it is 
understood by the human being. The Islamic belief in a hierarchy of Reality places the 
ontological reality of God within one and the same epistemological scheme.  
 
When approaching Islam as religion we do so with the tools made available by the field of 
religious studies. They are useful in terms of bringing us closer to an understanding of 
religious claims by precise definitions, regardless of what the claims are based on. We are 
not, however, to make judgments as to whether the conclusions of the arguments are true or 
false. Before we conclude our research, however, let us approach Islam as that which claims 
to be, namely knowledge.   
 
 
6.3. Islam as knowledge. 
 
6.3.1 Revelation as source of knowledge. 
 
When studying the arguments labelled ‗ontological‘, we saw that human religiosity, fitra, is 
thought to relate directly to a Reality independent of it. According to Bakar‘s methodology 
there is a direct link between the human intellect and divine revelation. Shalabi‘s description 
of this relationship is that the human being constitutes ‗the potential point of transition 
between God, who is beyond comprehension, in that He is pure Unity and is only knowable 
to Himself, and the created world‘273  On the one hand it means that human knowledge is 
limited and that God is beyond human understanding. On the other hand Islamic theology 
stresses that it is possible, or even required to know. Divine revelation is precisely this: a 
recognition of ‗man‘s essential inability to deal with his world‘274 and essentially the source 
of all knowledge.  
 
Islam is not unique in claiming religious beliefs to be factual. It is also far from the only 
religion to invest in philosophical reasoning. What the literature has shown is a widespread 
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use of scientific terms in support of divinely revealed knowledge. Bakar‘s agenda is not 
merely the defence of Islam. He esteems revealed religion as directly relevant for scientific 
pursuit. Islamic philosophy holds that all truth has one and the same unified source. It relates 
to the human intellect through the Active intellect.
275
. Thus to distinguish between 
knowledge which can be attained by reason, and knowledge which can only be acquired by 
revelation, it is not a concern. Islam does not share conceptual distinction between general 
and special revelation similar to that in Western thought. Islamic theologians may recognize 
a qualitative difference between that of which every human being should be naturally aware 
and the deeper awareness acquired through faith and worship. A clear distinction is not found 
in their argumentation, and it is not central. Islam is considered intellectually available to any 
reasonable person
276
 once it has been presented to them. While there are multiple ways in 
which God has made his will known, the words of the Qur‘an is withheld as the normative 
center, by which everything else is interpreted. Yet, there is no potential paradox inherent in 
what one should know about God ‗naturally‘ and what is made known in Scripture. As a 
consequence of this unified epistemology, authors of da‘wah seek not to reconcile religion 
and reason, but hold them up as fundamental allies from the very beginning.  
 
Two rather distinct ways of acquiring knowledge do appear from the material. First, these are 
knowledge which can be acquired through scientific study and second, knowledge based on 
that which is called ‗common sense‘. Each relate to man‘s ability to understand the world 
around him and of God in a reasonable way, and they are both expected to anticipate the 
clarity of the words of the Qur‘an. ‗Common sense‘ is generally used in support of the above 
mentioned fitra-argument. It refers to a quality of all human being as the subjective pole of 
knowledge, with all of its faculties. Knowledge of God‘s existence is self-evident or ‗natural 
(fitryah) to the intellect‘277 because each human being has already been equipped with 
potential knowledge by the Creator himself. The word ‗science‘ appears in variety of 
approaches, but it is always used to support truth claims.  
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6.3.2 The Western scientific model of knowledge:  
 
The possibilities, and limitations, of science are closely connected with its epistemological 
and anthropological starting point. Plato‘s simple condition of what can be considered 
‗knowledge‘ is true belief joined with good arguments278. It involves actual truthfulness as 
well as the knower being conscious of its truthfulness. Knowledge can also be understood in 
relational terms
279
. It entails the existence of a subject of knowledge, which is the human 
being, and the existence of an object of knowledge which can be experienced or understood.  
How does one acquire knowledge of an objective reality? Throughout the history of 
philosophy in the West, two main types of well-debated theories of knowledge give 
completely different answers, namely empiricism and rationalism.  
 
Knowledge can also be understood as perception. Empiricism means that knowledge should 
be acquired through experience
280, or more specifically, a ‗systematic enquiry of reality in 
order to acquire knowledge as verified experience.‘281 The latter definition underlines the 
methodology behind the acquisition of knowledge. Scientific knowledge as tried and tested 
experience ought to be universal, objective and constant
282
. An important principle in 
objective enquiry is that premises should not rest on a desired conclusion. It is a fundamental 
principle in scientific enquiry that evidence that is used to construct a theory, or hypothesis, 
cannot be used again as evidence of that theory
283
. If so, it ends in what we have called 
circular argumentation, where premises are not challenged, rather reinforced. Within what 
Chalmer calls ‗a widely held commonsensical view of science‘284 the problem would seem 
possible to avoid. Given that an objective reality exists prior to and independent of our 
research, we can define science as ‗knowledge derived from the facts of experience‘285. Yet, 
it still leaves open the question of which statements are borne out of observation and which 
not.
286
 If judgments about the truth of observation statements depend on what is already 
known or assumed, then the observable facts are as fallible as the presuppositions underlying 
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them. To Chalmer this suggests that even ‗the observable basis for science is not as 
straightforward and secure as is widely and traditionally supposed.‘287 Bakar appears to be 
the only one among the Islamic authors with a clear understanding of the problems with 
circular reasoning.  Yet, he concludes that the scientific models of the West are not more 
useful than others when it comes to reaching objective truth. Any scientific community, he 
says, is axiomatic in their research and thus modern science cannot be trusted any more than 
other worldviews
288
. On the contrary the existence of several scientific methods which have 
made objectivity a democratic enterprise lead to a fragmented world view. Bakar believes a 
shift is necessary and already on the way. 
 
Rationalism, as a way to knowledge, is defined as a priori reasoning, independent of 
observation and thus the counter-part of empiricism. The view on man‘s rationality as means 
to acquire true and certain knowledge has in western intellectual history shifted between 
orthodoxy, where knowledge is understood in relational terms, to a methodology of objective 
enquiry and critical reasoning. The demand for objectivity, related to the methodological 
agnosticism of phenomenology of religion, is the type of ‗organized skepticism‘289 in which 
the researcher is obligated to question established routines, authorities, theories and results of 
prior research
290
.  
 
 
6.3.3 Islamic perspectives on rationality.    
 
The western intellectual tradition defines ‗rational thought‘ as that which can be known by 
inference in terms of unaided reason. By contrast, revelation is understood as God‘s 
communication of truths which unaided human reason cannot grasp for itself
291
. From an 
Islamic point of view, the very notion that anything in the human being should be unaided or 
removed from the ‗aid‘ of God is unthinkable. In the da‟wah literature used for this study we 
find a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the human intellect. An Islamic model of 
knowledge opposes, and contrasts, ‗theoretical anarchism‘292. Meanwhile, there is a belief in 
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common sense. The arguments we have labelled ‗cosmological‘ link revelation directly to 
empirical observation in two different ways. First in that the universe bears witness of the 
existence of a Creator, secondly in that the unity of nature reflects the unity of the Creator.  
 
In Bakar‘s methodology facts are not ‗derived‘ from anywhere simply by using the proper 
scientific method. All knowledge has its origin in a comprehensive, unified revelation. The 
Qur‘an, the observable signs in nature and man‘s rationality are believed to have ultimately 
one and the same source, in Farabian terms: the Active intellect
293
. Bakar brings to the table a 
coherent methodology explaining how rationality is believed to mirror, and not, unlike a 
western rationality, challenge revelation. In Bakar‘s methodology the primary ‗function‘ of 
man‘s rationality is not in potential opposition to that which is observed. Rather, if 
functioning properly, it has the potential to ‗actualize‘ knowledge from the divine. In other 
words, revelation from God is not confined to the senses, or even to experience in a wider 
sense. More than that, it is directly linked with the human being‘s ultimate use of his or her 
rational mind. Every human being is thought to be equipped with a rational soul, holding the 
potential of acquiring knowledge through illumination by the Active intellect
294
. The 
discovery throughout this research has been that according to Islam it is not a matter of 
revelation or rationality. The Active intellect, serves as a model for intellectual perfection. 
Because the rational mind is created by God it is also created with potential knowledge of 
God. It is upon acceptance of the Qur‘an, which is the objective revelation, that the 
subjective revelation, namely man‘s intelligence, becomes an actuality. The rational mind is 
therefore neither ‗free‘ nor detached from religious belief. 
 
 
6.3.4 A phenomenological approach to science?  
 
The task of epistemology is to discover how knowledge differs from belief and opinion. In 
order to distinguish philosophically between the concepts of knowledge and belief, he asks:‘ 
Are the beliefs we hold capable of being true or false?‘295 Or is this precisely what makes 
them beliefs and not knowledge? A simple answer to the question is that knowledge can be 
scientifically proven, whereas religious belief can only be scientifically recorded. A 
                                                 
293
 See 5.3.2. Al-Farabi‘s psychology and the Active intellect.  
294
 See 5.3.2. Al-Farabi‘s psychology and the Active intellect. 
295
 Connolly 1999:121. 
59 
 
consequence of empirical-positivistic view on science has been that statements which claim 
to say something about reality must be empirically verifiable. Religious and metaphysical 
‗knowledge‘ such as ‗God exists‘ are not verifiable, nor falsifiable, and therefore 
meaningless per definition. But must science disregard ‗God‘ as object of study? As 
previously mentioned, an affirmation of ‗the holy‘ was introduced to solve this in question in 
the study or religion
296
. Da Silva and Ore trace the roots of phenomenology of religion to 
general philosophy. Phenomenology attempts to find answers to questions such as ‗how is 
knowledge possible at all?‘ and ‗how is objectivity possible at all?‘297 Can we trust sense 
perceptions to be factual?
298
 While all sciences seek knowledge in different forms, 
phenomenology must investigate the foundations for all knowledge and thus be the 
epistemological foundation for all sciences. According to da Silva and Ore, Husserl believes 
phenomenology should be the basis of all science
299
. Husserl uses the term ‗phenomenology‘ 
to describe something which ‗reveals‘ itself to our consciousness when we think of 
something, perceives, experiences or imagines something, ‗independently of the question of 
whether it exists as such in a natural reality‘300. The intentional quality of human 
consciousness is that it is always directed toward something other than itself. The intended 
object may not, however, have a logical relation to something real. Sometimes it exists 
merely as an intended object
301
. The moment a claim is made concerning the factual 
existence of whatever is described one has left the area of phenomenology. With the fitra 
argument, Islamic da‟wah authors follow also Husserl‘s phenomenology as far as to the 
intentional existence of God. Yet, it is exactly on the matter of existence that they separate. 
Arguments are clearly are presented as ‗proofs‘ of actual being. They are meant to leave the 
reader 'without a shred of doubt', that God does, in fact exist, and that he is One. A 
phenomenological approach to science is still unable to reconcile a western scientific model 
with Islamic attempts at scientifically proving God‘s existence.  
 
Conclusively, let us return to the question asked in the beginning of this chapter: Can a study 
of Islam involve questions of truth and falsity? Islam viewed as religion is a unified view of 
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knowledge, based on a set of axioms. As religion, a ‗closed system‘302, we are obliged to 
look at it from an outsider‘s perspective. Islam is best understood phenomenologically, 
through ‗bracketing.  If viewed as science, it must be questioned. A scientific claim is an 
invitation to challenge it, even if it ‗proved‘ impossible to disprove it. As ‗science‘, or 
objective truth, we have to approach it with the tools available to ‗anyone‘. When it is 
claimed that an intelligent person cannot fail to see that a certain argument leads to the 
truth
303
, we are all invited as insiders. If someone does fail to see that the argument is true, or 
can hold water scientifically, it is because their minds have not been illuminated with divine 
revelation and remain in the dark
304
. Although this is logically very possible, it not easily 
verified or falsified and we have therefore left the area of science. Chalmers articulates the 
undesirability of making ad hoc claims.  Science as an open system aims for simplicity, but 
as noted by Chalmers, by the time evidence is used to construct a theory it cannot be used 
again as evidence of that theory
305
. Once a circular argument has been detected, it is 
necessary to reevaluate its epistemological foundations. Islam escapes the critical questioning 
which is so crucial to science. As a closed system, it remains, in scientific terms, an ad hoc 
hypothesis.   
 
 
 
6.4. Getting the message across. 
 
 
Da‟wa literature holds that the message of Islam is simple, reasonable and highly important. 
But does the message communicate with the reader? Conclusions such as ‗God exists‘ and 
‗God is One‘ are believed to be impossible to get around. Yet, the validity of the arguments 
stumble upon a set of obstacles when communicating to a Western intellectual tradition. 
Towards the end we will briefly deal with three of them.  
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6.4.1 The three archetypes of knowledge versus a unified view of knowledge. 
 
In the Western world three archetypes of knowledge have evolved, the humanities, theology 
and nature. Whaling explains how each has played a role as the dominant model. To the 
ancient Greeks, ‗religion‘ in its different forms found its place the humanities. At the time of 
Aquinas, theology became ‗the queen of sciences‘306, ruling over philosophical thought. In 
the wake of the modern era, the theological world view was replaced with a natural world 
view, in which experimental science gradually became the basis for all certain knowledge. 
By contrast, the Muslim world has largely been able to maintain a view in which the Qur‘an 
remains the utmost expression of truth while all other sources of knowledge confirm this 
knowledge in a unified epistemology.  
 
In our literature, arguments aspiring to be academic appear to be drawn from an unwarranted 
mix of disciplines. As an example, we have seen efforts to prove God‘s existence with the 
help of geology and its relation to the miraculous nature of a literary text
307
. Other authors 
draw support from seemingly random references to scholars from another time, unrecognized 
in academic circles or unnoticed by the general public
308
. The result is confusion. The 
western reader is left unable to follow the logical steps of an argument and to recognize it as 
reasoning on the level it claims to be. The literature appeals to man‘s own ability to reason. 
Yet, this is exactly where it fails to persuade. As noted throughout the study, Islamic authors 
do not operate with a distinction between religious belief and science. God‘s existence and 
unity is expected to fall under the category of knowledge. Whereas the Western reader is 
expecting the notion of God falling into the category of ‗religion‘ he is introduced to an 
unfamiliar category of scientific knowledge. Islam presents God‘s existence as the most 
fundamental knowledge of all. In the mind of the Western reader, ‗God‘ is the very last thing 
that can be labelled scientific.  
 
A lack of friction between religious thought and scientific enquiry has implications on the 
Islamic understanding of causality. Whereas a scientific world view is preoccupied with 
examining the possible relationships between matters and events, an Islamic world view 
makes the existence of all that happens, in every possible mode, directly dependent on the 
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will and act of God. Bakar believes strongly in Islamic science. The ‗modern scientific 
worldview‘ is in his view an unsuitable method to acquiring knowledge because it does not 
take into account the relationship between God and the things of the world. This is also 
recognized by Musavi Lari. No experiment can be set up to determine whether a non-
material being exists or not, ‗because only what can be negated by means of experiment can 
be proven by means of experiment‗ 309 Hameed explains how the empirical positivistic 
approach ‗led to the belief that human beings are constituted in such a way that the 
knowledge of reality is always unavailable to them‘310. Reality behind appearances was 
placed beyond the scope of human understanding and therefore be abandoned. 
Consequentially, to speak of ‗proof‘ with regard to a transcendent being became irrelevant.  
Some authors who recognize the problems of conveying the proper message, sees that there 
is more to this than just a communicative aspect.  Nasr is not afraid to point at the ‗blind 
emulation of Western models blended often in ad hoc fashion with what has survived of the 
madrasah system.‘ In his view this is currently causing confusion and chaos in education 
curricula. Islamic scholars who adapt western models lose the unified perspective. Their 
arguments fall apart not because of the competition that these western models represent, but 
because they are blended in. It is against this background that Bakar calls for a revival of the 
Islamic scientific pursuit, and strengthen especially the area of education 
311
. Elmessiri would 
like to see that ‗rather than imposing Western analytical categories on the Islamic worldview, 
the bearers of the new discourse try to discover its fundamental categories‘312 As he puts it: 
‗The bearers of the new discourse neither reject nor accept the West uncritically.‘313  
 
As mentioned previously, the Western view of Islam has been shaped by theories of societal 
evolution. Once the leading in both anthropology and history of religion, they are now 
considered barely respectable academic circles. They are nevertheless alive and well in 
popular culture
314
 and have resulted in for example a notion that the Muslim world is living 
in the Middle Ages and has not reached Enlightenment and corresponding scientific progress 
and humanistic values
315
  Further, the notion that any difficulties these societies might face 
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stem from remaining in a dark, theological world view, now nearly completely left behind by 
the Western world.  Without upholding the presupposition of societal evolution, we can 
conclude that historically, the Islamic world has escaped processes or crises similar to those 
of the West. Following Whaling, we may say that it is the Western world that has always 
lacked, as it seems, a unified view of knowledge. Facing a global context, the third mode of 
knowledge currently ruling in the West is always going to subject to replacement with a 
new
316
. 
 
 
6.3.2. An optimistic view on the human being and the reception of truth. 
 
As we saw in the beginning, authors of da‟wah literature utter frustration of the misplaced 
image given of Islam in the West. Misconceptions, not disagreement, are believed to be the 
main problem. After establishing this, an analysis may follow of what is believed to really be 
the crisis of the Western world, such as unbelief
317
 conflicting ideologies of materialism and 
communism
318
, and reductionist views on science
319
.  The Islamic world has been able to 
maintain a unified world view and it enjoys a status as the ruling theological tradition. The 
optimism on behalf of Islam is rooted in its anthropology, described in detail in chapter 5. 
Combined with a strong belief in Islam‘s universality, the result is belief in 
‗enlightenment‘320 as the missing piece in the desired development. As Shalabi puts it, 
‗[a]midst the ruins of a thousand faiths and secular ideologies, Islam, religion of life, lives 
on.‘321 
 
Although perhaps more thoroughly shaken and more frequently thrown overboard, the West 
also has its foundations. A positive view on humanity‘s ‗natural disposition‘ is not one of 
them, and such claims will in themselves be liable to invoke at least some sort of scepticism. 
Doubt is not considered a moral virtue in the Islamic world. In the West, doubt is considered 
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not only a moral virtue, it is also considered reasonable. The Christian tradition of West 
knows a tradition of apologetics, which is the attempt to present of religious belief in such a 
way that it meets counter arguments based on doubt. According to Islamic da‟wah, faith and 
reason are not opposed. Consequentially, Islam does not need ‗defense‘ or ‗apologies‘.  A 
clear presentation of the foundations of Islam is believed to be sufficient. When facing a 
Western audience, however, it meets the demand for a process of reasoning which appears 
exactly what it claims to be, namely objective. In Islamic methodology ‗objectivity‘ seems to 
refer to realization of potential knowledge in terms of intuition and perception. A modern 
western understanding of objectivity emphasizes empirical verification and detachment. A 
persuasive argument is one which takes objections into account and meets the counter-
arguments in a proper way. When self-critique is completely missing, it is difficult to accept 
results of scientific studies as ‗objective‘.  To the ‗insider‘, using  Connolly‘s term again322, 
tawheed makes all the necessary sense, while the ‗outsider‘ remains in the outside, not any 
more worried about his own ability to think rationally. 
 
 
6.3.3 A disinterested approach to „God‟.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, Islamic da‟wah meets with a habit of treating the issue 
of transcendence as ‘phenomenon‘. Historically, ‗natural theology‘, has played a part also in 
Western philosophy. Aquinas held that certain things about God are demonstrable by reason: 
such as he exists, he is one, and he is good.
323
 To accept these conclusions does not entail or 
necessitate religious faith.  Belief in God is thus not an article of faith, but a prerequisite to 
faith. One is self-evident, the other is not. This is an essential distinction in Christian 
theology, but a foreign concept in Islam. In Islam, There is no need for ‗additional‘ 
revelations. Belief in the existence of the One God is ceaselessly linked to the worship of 
him. In phenomenology, the actual relationship between the object of research and the 
metaphysical or transcendent dimension of reality
324
 is irrelevant. Once such a claim has 
been made, one has left the phenomenological approach, and with that the area of scientific 
study. Meanwhile, the more modern idea of ‗the holy‘ has made it possible to identify ‗God‘ 
as an object of study. We have previously seen parallels between the field of religious studies 
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and Islamic arguments in approaching ‗God‘ on an intentional level. Where they separate just 
at the point where the actual ‗Being‘325 of the transcendent is in question. ‗ God‘ remains, in 
phenomenological terms, noema
326
.  
 
A phenomenological approach to religion is to serve as an alternative to reductionism and 
judgment.  Yet, any approach which does not consider truth or falsity will in a sense ‗reduce‘ 
what the Islamic scholars are trying to achieve. Da‟wah literature does not ask the reader to 
understand or analyze. It expects the reader to take a stand. Yet, even in a situation where all 
misconceptions were overcome, the arguments meet with a western habit of continually 
questioning truth claims, philosophical as well as religious. The possibility of an absolute 
truth in existence is not excluded. Anyone claiming to have grasped it completely, however, 
meets with an environment where one is satisfied with identifying axioms and agreeing to 
disagree. In its scientific quest, the West seems content with holding up a preference for 
objectivity before truth. Even in the cases where questions concerning ‗God‘ is considered 
with great care and serious analyses it is still detached from the question of ontology. 
Relativism as such may not be the conclusion, but it has become an essential skill to be able 
to pretend that it does not matter whether God exists or not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
325
 Heidegger writes ‘Being‘ with a capital B when referring to it in purely ontological terms. Da Silva 1982:56 
326
Noema: intended object. Da Silva/Ore 1996:in reference to Husserl 1950:181.  
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7. Summary and conclusion 
 
 
In the beginning we set out to come closer to a phenomenological understanding of Islam, its 
epistemological foundations in particular. From what we are able to conclude as a result of 
this study of Islamic da‟wah literature, we can say the following: 
 
Islamic da‟wah holds that God, by definition, is fundamentally different from creation. He is 
transcendent and can not be comprehended by the human being. There are nevertheless a lot 
of ways available with which the human being can come to certain knowledge of God‘s 
existence; through recognizing the religious nature of man, through observing nature, and 
through the study of Scripture. 
 
When it comes to the Islamic understanding of the nature of God, one principle is at the 
center, and that is tawhid, the principle of divine unity. Tawhid signifies more than the unity 
of God only. An important doctrine is that the unity of God is reflected in the unity of nature. 
It is through revelation in a unified sense that God‘s existence and nature becomes evident. 
Revelation in a unified sense means the words of the Qur‘an, the universe reflecting God‘s 
unity and the religious nature of the human being. The principle of tawhid is thus the 
underlying principle in Islamic epistemology. It is used to prove divine unity as well as the 
existence of God. We have seen arguments showing that a proper definition of God, that he is 
one, is believed to be enough to conclude that he exists. It is difficult to find arguments 
which take into account that the premises could be subject to questioning. The desired 
conclusion of the argument may be drawn upon as its main support. Any counter-argument is 
met with the claim that counter-arguments are impossible. Within the epistemological 
scheme of Islam, perhaps they are.  
 
Osman Bakar explains the epistemological scheme of Islam in terms of a unified system of 
methodologies, in which he incorporates the belief in the Qur‘an as divine revelation. Bakar 
further links the principle of tawhid to objectivity. He criticizes the Western view on 
objectivity which encourages critical reasoning and doubt, and rejects what he calls 
theoretical anarchism as a means to acquire knowledge. In his view, it is precisely because 
objective truth exists that doubt is possible. 
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While tawhid is at the centre of Islamic epistemology, the question of revelation also relates 
to the principle if the hierarchy of beings. Bakar understands revelation in relational terms.  
Using models developed by philosophers of the earliest centuries of Islam, he seeks to show 
that there is a direct correspondence between objective Reality, which is hierarchical in 
nature, and the knowing subject, which is the hierarchy of the faculties of the human soul. 
According to these models, each level of Reality has a corresponding mode of knowledge in 
the human being. There is an objective pole of knowledge, its ontological principle being the 
Divine intellect, or the Logos, and a corresponding pole of subjective knowledge, which is 
the human soul.  
 
It is not the transcendent God himself who is the revealed. In accordance with tawhid, the 
Qur‘an, nature and the rational faculty of the human intellect are thought to all have the same 
metaphysical basis, or source. While truth can ultimately have only one source, the 
conclusion of the argument is that this metaphysical basis must be God. The arguments 
presented in chapters 3 and 4 suggest that knowledge of God‘s existence and unity can be 
acquired through observation as well as rational thought. In the model presented by Bakar, 
revelation is understood in terms of supra-rational perception.  Potential knowledge becomes 
actual knowledge upon illumination by the Active intellect. It is in the rational faculty of the 
human soul, which is of a spiritual substance, that the acquisition of divine knowledge takes 
place.  
 
The Islamic understanding of rationality is thus fundamentally different from a Western 
understanding of rationality. Within the epistemological scheme of Islam the rational mind is 
neither free nor fundamentally detached from religion. Rather, it is directly related to divine 
knowledge. Consequently, it does not make sense to rationalize oneself out of religious 
belief. In the literature this comes to an expression through a general absence of critical 
reasoning. Epistemological doubt is explained away with the help of a comprehensive world 
view which does not, and cannot, separate between the rationality of the human being and 
divine revelation.   
 
The aim of Islamic da‟wah literature, in the sense that it appeals to the intellect, is to make 
the reader accept Islam as knowledge. Meanwhile, Islam maintains that God is, undoubtedly 
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and by definition, transcendent. From the perspective of a western model of knowledge, 
proofs regarding transcendence are indirect proofs, and serve at best as indications.  God is 
not known unless it is God who is actually revealed. The Islamic objection that God cannot 
directly reveal himself without ceasing to be transcendent is logically valid, but rests on an 
axiom which disqualifies it from a Western understanding of scientific knowledge.  
 
It is through the placement of scientific knowledge and knowledge about God within one and 
the same epistemological scheme of tawhid that efforts to scientifically prove God‘s 
existence and nature are made possible. However, by not touching upon the premises of their 
arguments, Islamic authors remain inside tawhid throughout the entire discourse, whereas the 
critical reader remains on the outside.  
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